evolution and ethics and other essays-第22部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


whatever　＇though　it　must　be　owned　at　the　same　time；　that　we　have　some
notion　of　soul；　spirit；　and　the　operations　of　the　mind；　such　as
willing；　loving；　hating；　inasmuch　as　we　know　or　understand　the　meaning
of　these　words〃。　（The　Principles　of　Human　Knowledge；　lxxvi。　See　also
sections　lxxxix。；　cxxxv。；　cxlv。）

It　is　open　to　discussion；　I　think；　whether　it　is　possible　to　have
〃some　notion〃　of　that　of　which　we　can　form　no　〃idea。〃

Berkeley　attaches　several　predicates　to　the　〃perceiving　active　being
mind；　spirit；　soul　or　myself〃　（Parts　I。　II。）　It　is　said；　for　example；
to　be　〃indivisible；　incorporeal；　unextended；　and　incorruptible。〃　The
predicate　indivisible；　though　negative　in　form；　has　highly　positive
consequences。　For；　if　〃perceiving　active　being〃　is　strictly
indivisible；　man's　soul　must　be　one　with　the　Divine　spirit：　which　is
good　Hindu　or　Stoical　doctrine；　but　hardly　orthodox　Christian
philosophy。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　the　〃substance〃　of　active
perceiving　〃being〃　is　actually　divided　into　the　one　Divine　and
innumerable　human　entities；　how　can　the　predicate　〃indivisible〃　be
rigorously　applicable　to　it？

Taking　the　words　cited；　as　they　stand；　the　amount　to　the　denial　of　the
possibility　of　any　knowledge　of　substance。　〃Matter〃　having　been
resolved　into　mere　affections　of　〃spirit〃；　〃spirit〃　melts　away　into　an
admittedly　inconceivable　and　unknowable　＇99＇　hypostasis　of　thought　and
powerconsequently　the　existence　of　anything　in　the　universe　beyond　a
flow　of　phenomena　is　a　purely　hypothetical　assumption。　Indeed　a
pyrrhonist　might　raise　the　objection　that　if　〃esse〃　is　〃percipi〃
spirit　itself　can　have　no　existence　except　as　a　perception；
hypostatized　into　a　〃self；〃　or　as　a　perception　of　some　other　spirit。
In　the　former　case；　objective　reality　vanishes；　in　the　latter；　there
would　seem　to　be　the　need　of　an　infinite　series　of　spirits　each
perceiving　the　others。

It　is　curious　to　observe　how　very　closely　the　phraseology　of　Berkeley
sometimes　approaches　that　of　the　Stoics：　thus　（cxlviii。）　〃It　seems　to
be　a　general　pretence　of　the　unthinking　herd　that　they　cannot　see　God。
。　。　But；　alas；　we　need　only　open　our　eyes　to　see　the　Sovereign　Lord　of
all　things　with　a　more　full　and　clear　view；　than　we　do　any　of　our
fellow…creatures　。　。　　。　we　do　at　all　times　and　in　all　places　perceive
manifest　tokens　of　the　Divinity：　everything　we　see；　hear；　feel；　or　any
wise　perceive　by　sense；　being　a　sign　or　effect　of　the　power　of　God〃　。
。　。　cxlix。　〃It　is　therefore　plain；　that　nothing　can　be　more　evident　to
any　one　that　is　capable　of　the　least　reflection；　than　the　existence　of
God；　or　a　spirit　who　is　intimately　present　to　our　minds；　producing　in
them　all　that　variety　of　ideas　or　sensations　which　continually　affect
us；　on　whom　we　have　an　absolute　and　entire　dependence；　in　short；　in
whom　we　live　and　move　and　have　our　being。〃　cl。　〃＇But　you　will　say　hath
Nature　no　share　in　the　production　of　natural　things；　and　must　they　all
be　ascribed　to　the　immediate　and　sole　operation　of　God？　。。。　if　by
Nature　is　＇100＇　meant　some　being　distinct　from　God；　as　well　as　from
the　laws　of　nature　and　things　perceived　by　sense；　I　must　confess　that
word　is　to　me　an　empty　sound；　without　any　intelligible　meaning　annexed
to　it。＇　Nature　in　this　acceptation　is　a　vain　Chimaera　introduced　by
those　heathens；　who　had　not　just　notions　of　the　omnipresence　and
infinite　perfection　of　God。〃

Compare　Seneca　（De　Beneficiis；　iv。　7）：

〃Natura；　inquit；　haec　mihi　praestat。　Non　intelligis　te；　quum　hoc
dicis；　mutare　Nomen　Deo？　Quid　enim　est　aliud　Natura　quam　Deus；　et
divina　ratio；　toti　mundo　et　partibus　ejus　inserta？　Quoties　voles　tibi
licet　aliter　hunc　auctorem　rerum　nostrarum　compellare；　et　Jovem　illum
optimum　et　maximum　rite　dices；　et　tonantem；　et　statorem：　qui　non；　ut
historici　tradiderunt；　ex　eo　quod　post　votum　susceptum　acies　Romanorum
fugientum　stetit；　sed　quod　stant　beneficio　ejus　omnina；　stator；
stabilitorque　est：　hunc　eundem　et　fatum　si　dixeris；　non　mentieris；　nam
quum　fatum　nihil　aliud　est；　quam　series　implexa　causarum；　ille　est
prima　omnium　causa；　ea　qua　caeterae　pendent。〃　It　would　appear；
therefore；　that　the　good　Bishop　is　somewhat　hard　upon　the　〃heathen；〃
of　whose　words　his　own　might　be　a　paraphrase。

There　is　yet　another　direction　in　which　Berkeley's　philosophy；　I　will
not　say　agrees　with　Gautama's；　but　at　any　rate　helps　to　make　a
fundamental　dogma　of　Buddhism　intelligible。

〃I　find　I　can　excite　ideas　in　my　mind　at　pleasure；　and　vary　and　shift
the　scene　as　often　as　I　think　fit。　It　is　no　more　than　willing；　and
straightway　this　or　that　idea　arises　in　my　fancy：　and　by　the　same
power　＇101＇　it　is　obliterated；　and　makes　way　for　another。　This　making
and　unmaking　of　ideas　doth　very　properly　denominate　the　mind　active。
This　much　is　certain　and　grounded　on　experience。　。　。〃　（Principles；
xxviii。）

A　good　many　of　us；　I　fancy；　have　reason　to　think　that　experience　tells
them　very　much　the　contrary；　and　are　painfully　familiar　with　the
obsession　of　the　mind　by　ideas　which　cannot　be　obliterated　by　any
effort　of　the　will　and　steadily　refuse　to　make　way　for　others。　But
what　I　desire　to　point　out　is　that　if　Gautama　was　equally　confident
that　he　could　〃make　and　unmake〃　ideasthen；　since　he　had　resolved
self　into　a　group　of　ideal　phantomsthe　possibility　of　abolishing
self　by　volition　naturally　followed。

Note　9　（P。　68）。

According　to　Buddhism；　the　relation　of　one　life　to　the　next　is　merely
that　borne　by　the　flame　of　one　lamp　to　the　flame　of　another　lamp　which
is　set　alight　by　it。　To　the　〃Arahat〃　or　adept　〃no　outward　form；　no
compound　thing；　no　creature；　no　creator；　no　existence　of　any　kind；
must　appear　to　be　other　than　a　temporary　collocation　of　its　component
parts；　fated　inevitably　to　be　dissolved。〃（Rhys　Davids；　Hibbert
Lectures；　p。　211。）

The　self　is　nothing　but　a　group　of　phenomena　held　together　by　the
desire　of　life；　when　that　desire　shall　have　ceased；　〃the　Karma　of　that
particular　chain　of　lives　will　cease　to　influence　any　longer　any
distinct　individual；　and　there　will　be　no　more　birth；　＇102＇　for　birth；
decay；　and　death；　grief；　lamentation；　and　despair　will　have　come；　so
far　as　regards　that　chain　of　lives；　for　ever　to　an　end。〃

The　state　of　mind　of　the　Arahat　in　which　the　desire　of　life　has　ceased
is　Nirvana。　Dr。　Oldenberg　has　very　acutely　and　patiently　considered
the　various　interpretations　which　have　been　attached　to　〃Nirvana〃　in
the　work　to　which　I　have　referred　（pp。　285　et　seq。）。　The　result　of　his
and　other　discussions　of　the　question　may　I　think　be　briefly　stated
thus：

1。　Logical　deduction　from　the　predicates　attached　to　the　term
〃Nirvana〃　strips　it　of　all　reality；　conceivability；　or　perceivability；
whether　by　Gods　or　men。　For　all　practical　purposes；　therefore；　it
comes　to　exactly　the　same　thing　as　annihilation。

2。　But　it　is　not　annihilation　in　the　ordinary　sense；　inasmuch　as　it
could　take　place　in　the　living　Arahat　or　Buddha。

3。　And；　since；　for　the　faithful　Buddhist；　that　which　was　abolished　in
the　Arahat　was　the　possibility　of　further　pain；　sorrow；　or　sin；　and
that　which　was　attained　was　perfect　peace；　his　mind　directed　itself
exclusively　to　this　joyful　consummation；　and　personified　the　negati