the critique of judgement-第13部分

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agreeable　that　it　pleases；　but　that　it　gratifies。　I　do　not　accord　it　a　simple　approval；　but　inclination　is　aroused　by　it；　and　where　agreeableness　is　of　the　liveliest　type　a　judgement　on　the　character　of　the　object　is　so　entirely　out　of　place　that　those　who　are　always　intent　only　on　enjoyment　（for　that　is　the　word　used　to　denote　intensity　of　gratification）　would　fain　dispense　with　all　judgement。

　　　　　　　SS　4。　Delight　in　the　good　is　coupled　with　interest。

　　That　is　good　which　by　means　of　reason　commends　itself　by　its　mere　concept。　We　call　that　good　for　something　which　only　pleases　as　a　means；　but　that　which　pleases　on　its　own　account　we　call　good　in　itself。　In　both　cases　the　concept　of　an　end　is　implied；　and　consequently　the　relation　of　reason　to　（at　least　possible）　willing；　and　thus　a　delight　in　the　existence　of　an　object　or　action；　i。e。；　some　interest　or　other。　　　To　deem　something　good；　I　must　always　know　what　sort　of　a　thing　the　object　is　intended　to　be；　i。　e。；　I　must　have　a　concept　of　it。　That　is　not　necessary　to　enable　me　to　see　beauty　in　a　thing。　Flowers；　free　patterns；　lines　aimlessly　intertwining…technically　termed　foliage…have　no　signification；　depend　upon　no　definite　concept；　and　yet　please。　Delight　in　the　beautiful　must　depend　upon　the　reflection　on　an　object　precursory　to　some　（not　definitely　determined）　concept。　It　is　thus　also　differentiated　from　the　agreeable；　which　rests　entirely　upon　sensation。　　　In　many　cases；　no　doubt；　the　agreeable　and　the　good　seem　convertible　terms。　Thus　it　is　commonly　said　that　all　（especially　lasting）　gratification　is　of　itself　good；　which　is　almost　equivalent　to　saying　that　to　be　permanently　agreeable　and　to　be　good　are　identical。　But　it　is　readily　apparent　that　this　is　merely　a　vicious　confusion　of　words；　for　the　concepts　appropriate　to　these　expressions　are　far　from　interchangeable。　The　agreeable；　which；　as　such；　represents　the　object　solely　in　relation　to　sense；　must　in　the　first　instance　be　brought　under　principles　of　reason　through　the　concept　of　an　end；　to　be；　as　an　object　of　will；　called　good。　But　that　the　reference　to　delight　is　wholly　different　where　what　gratifies　is　at　the　same　time　called　good；　is　evident　from　the　fact　that　with　the　good　the　question　always　is　whether　it　is　mediately　or　immediately　good；　i。　e。；　useful　or　good　in　itself；　whereas　with　the　agreeable　this　point　can　never　arise；　since　the　word　always　means　what　pleases　immediately…and　it　is　just　the　same　with　what　I　call　beautiful。　　　Even　in　everyday　parlance；　a　distinction　is　drawn　between　the　agreeable　and　the　good。　We　do　not　scruple　to　say　of　a　dish　that　stimulates　the　palate　with　spices　and　other　condiments　that　it　is　agreeable　owning　all　the　while　that　it　is　not　good：　because；　while　it　immediately　satisfies　the　senses；　it　is　mediately　displeasing；　i。　e。；　in　the　eye　of　reason　that　looks　ahead　to　the　consequences。　Even　in　our　estimate　of　health；　this　same　distinction　may　be　traced。　To　all　that　possess　it；　it　is　immediately　agreeable…at　least　negatively；　i。　e。；　as　remoteness　of　all　bodily　pains。　But；　if　we　are　to　say　that　it　is　good；　we　must　further　apply　to　reason　to　direct　it　to　ends；　that　is；　we　must　regard　it　as　a　state　that　puts　us　in　a　congenial　mood　for　all　we　have　to　do。　Finally；　in　respect　of　happiness　every　one　believes　that　the　greatest　aggregate　of　the　pleasures　of　life；　taking　duration　as　well　as　number　into　account；　merits　the　name　of　a　true；　nay　even　of　the　highest；　good。　But　reason　sets　its　face　against　this　too。　Agreeableness　is　enjoyment。　But　if　this　is　all　that　we　are　bent　on；　it　would　be　foolish　to　be　scrupulous　about　the　means　that　procure　it　for　us…whether　it　be　obtained　passively　by　the　bounty　of　nature　or　actively　and　by　the　work　of　our　own　hands。　But　that　there　is　any　intrinsic　worth　in　the　real　existence　of　a　man　who　merely　lives　for　enjoyment；　however　busy　he　may　be　in　this　respect；　even　when　in　so　doing　he　serves　others…all　equally　with　himself　intent　only　on　enjoyment…as　an　excellent　means　to　that　one　end；　and　does　so；　moreover；　because　through　sympathy　he　shares　all　their　gratifications…this　is　a　view　to　which　reason　will　never　let　itself　be　brought　round。　Only　by　what　a　man　does　heedless　of　enjoyment；　in　complete　freedom；　and　independently　of　what　he　can　procure　passively　from　the　hand　of　nature；　does　be　give　to　his　existence；　as　the　real　existence　of　a　person；　an　absolute　worth。　Happiness；　with　all　its　plethora　of　pleasures；　is　far　from　being　an　unconditioned　good。*

　　*An　obligation　to　enjoyment　is　a　patent　absurdity。　And　the　same；　then；　must　also　be　said　of　a　supposed　obligation　to　actions　that　have　merely　enjoyment　for　their　aim；　no　matter　how　spiritually　this　enjoyment　may　be　refined　in　thought　（or　embellished）；　and　even　if　it　be　a　mystical；　so…called　heavenly；　enjoyment。

　　But；　despite　all　this　difference　between　the　agreeable　and　the　good；　they　both　agree　in　being　invariably　coupled　with　an　interest　in　their　object。　This　is　true；　not　alone　of　the　agreeable；　SS　3；　and　of　the　mediately　good；　i；　e。；　the　useful；　which　pleases　as　a　means　to　some　pleasure；　but　also　of　that　which　is　good　absolutely　and　from　every　point　of　view；　namely　the　moral　good　which　carries　with　it　the　highest　interest。　For　the　good　is　the　object　of　will；　i。　e。；　of　a　rationally　determined　faculty　of　desire）。　But　to　will　something；　and　to　take　a　delight　in　its　existence；　i。e。；　to　take　an　interest　in　it；　are　identical。

　　　　　　SS　5。　Comparison　of　the　three　specifically　different　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　kinds　of　delight。

　　Both　the　agreeable　and　the　good　involve　a　reference　to　the　faculty　of　desire；　and　are　thus　attended；　the　former　with　a　delight　pathologically　conditioned　（by　stimuli）；　the　latter　with　a　pure　practical　delight。　Such　delight　is　determined　not　merely　by　the　representation　of　the　object；　but　also　by　the　represented　bond　of　connection　between　the　subject　and　the　real　existence　of　the　object。　It　is　not　merely　the　object；　but　also　its　real　existence；　that　pleases。　On　the　other　hand；　the　judgement　of　taste　is　simply　contemplative；　i。　e。；　it　is　a　judgement　which　is　indifferent　as　to　the　existence　of　an　object；　and　only　decides　how　its　character　stands　with　the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　displeasure。　But　not　even　is　this　contemplation　itself　directed　to　concepts；　for　the　judgement　of　taste　is　not　a　cognitive　judgement　（neither　a　theoretical　one　nor　a　practical）；　and　hence；　also；　is　not　grounded　on　concepts；　nor　yet　intentionally　directed　to　them。　　　The　agreeable；　the　beautiful；　and　the　good　thus　denote　three　different　relations　of　representations　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　displeasure；　as　a　feeling　in　respect　of　which　we　distinguish　different　objects　or　modes　of　representation。　Also；　the　corresponding　expressions　which　indicate　our　satisfaction　in　them　are　different　The　agreeable　is　what　GRATIFIES　a　man；　the　beautiful　what　simply　PLEASES　him；　the　good　what　is　ESTEEMED　（approved）；　i。e。；　that　on　which　he　sets　an　objective　worth。　Agreeableness　is　a　significant　factor　even　with　irrational　animals；　beauty　has　purport　and　significance　only　for　human　beings；　i。e。；　for　beings　at　once　animal　and　rational　（but　not　merely　for　them　as　rational…intelligent　beings…but　only　for　them　as　at　once　animal　and　ratio