the critique of judgement-第2部分

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equate　to　render　intelligible　or　explicable；　and　in　which　judgement　may　have　recourse　to　itself　for　a　principle　of　the　reference　of　the　natural　thing　to　the　unknowable　supersensible　and；　indeed；　must　employ　some　such　principle；　though　with　a　regard　only　to　itself　and　the　knowledge　of　nature。　For　in　these　cases　the　application　of　such　an　a　priori　principle　for　the　cognition　of　what　is　in　the　world　is　both　possible　and　necessary；　and　withal　opens　out　prospects　which　are　profitable　for　practical　reason。　But　here　there　is　no　immediate　reference　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure。　But　this　is　precisely　the　riddle　in　the　principle　of　judgement　that　necessitates　a　separate　division　for　this　faculty　in　the　critique…for　there　was　nothing　to　prevent　the　formation　of　logical　estimates　according　to　concepts　（from　which　no　immediate　conclusion　can　ever　be　drawn　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure）　having　been　treated；　with　a　critical　statement　of　its　limitations；　in　an　appendage　to　the　theoretical　part　of　philosophy。　　　The　present　investigation　of　taste；　as　a　faculty　of　aesthetic　judgement；　not　being　undertaken　with　a　view　to　the　formation　or　culture　of　taste　（which　will　pursue　its　course　in　the　future；　as　in　the　past；　independently　of　such　inquiries）；　but　being　merely　directed　to　its　transcendental　aspects；　I　feel　assured　of　its　indulgent　criticism　in　respect　of　any　shortcomings　on　that　score。　But　in　all　that　is　relevant　to　the　transcendental　aspect　it　must　be　prepared　to　stand　the　test　of　the　most　rigorous　examination。　Yet　even　here　I　venture　to　hope　that　the　difficulty　of　unravelling　a　problem　so　involved　in　its　nature　may　serve　as　an　excuse　for　a　certain　amount　of　hardly　avoidable　obscurity　in　its　solution；　provided　that　the　accuracy　of　our　statement　of　the　principle　is　proved　with　all　requisite　clearness。　I　admit　that　the　mode　of　deriving　the　phenomena　of　judgement　from　that　principle　has　not　all　the　lucidity　that　is　rightly　demanded　elsewhere；　where　the　subject　is　cognition　by　concepts；　and　that　I　believe　I　have　in　fact　attained　in　the　second　part　of　this　work。　　　With　this；　then；　I　bring　my　entire　critical　undertaking　to　a　close。　I　shall　hasten　to　the　doctrinal　part；　in　order；　as　far　as　possible；　to　snatch　from　my　advancing　years　what　time　may　yet　be　favourable　to　the　task。　It　is　obvious　that　no　separate　division　of　doctrine　is　reserved　for　the　faculty　of　judgement；　seeing　that；　with　judgement；　critique　takes　the　place　of　theory；　but；　following　the　division　of　philosophy　into　theoretical　and　practical；　and　of　pure　philosophy　in　the　same　way；　the　whole　ground　will　be　covered　by　the　metaphysics　of　nature　and　of　morals。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　INTRODUCTION。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。　Division　of　Philosophy。

　　Philosophy　may　be　said　to　contain　the　principles　of　the　rational　cognition　that　concepts　afford　us　of　things　（not　merely；　as　with　logic；　the　principles　of　the　form　of　thought　in　general　irrespective　of　the　objects）；　and；　thus　interpreted；　the　course；　usually　adopted；　of　dividing　it　into　theoretical　and　practical　is　perfectly　sound。　But　this　makes　imperative　a　specific　distinction　on　the　part　of　the　concepts　by　which　the　principles　of　this　rational　cognition　get　their　object　assigned　to　them；　for　if　the　concepts　are　not　distinct　they　fail　to　justify　a　division；　which　always　presupposes　that　the　principles　belonging　to　the　rational　cognition　of　the　several　parts　of　the　science　in　question　are　themselves　mutually　exclusive。　　　Now　there　are　but　two　kinds　of　concepts；　and　these　yield　a　corresponding　number　of　distinct　principles　of　the　possibility　of　their　objects。　The　concepts　referred　to　are　those　of　nature　and　that　of　freedom。　By　the　first　of　these；　a　theoretical　cognition　from　a　priori　principles　becomes　possible。　In　respect　of　such　cognition；　however；　the　second；　by　its　very　concept；　imports　no　more　than　a　negative　principle　（that　of　simple　antithesis）；　while　for　the　determination　of　the　will；　on　the　other　hand；　it　establishes　fundamental　principles　which　enlarge　the　scope　of　its　activity；　and　which　on　that　account　are　called　practical。　Hence　the　division　of　philosophy　falls　properly　into　two　parts；　quite　distinct　in　their　principles…a　theoretical；　as　philosophy　of　nature；　and　a　practical；　as　philosophy　of　morals　（for　this　is　what　the　practical　legislation　of　reason　by　the　concept　of　freedom　is　called）。　Hitherto；　however；　in　the　application　of　these　expressions　to　the　division　of　the　different　principles；　and　with　them　to　the　division　of　philosophy；　a　gross　misuse　of　the　terms　has　prevailed；　for　what　is　practical　according　to　concepts　of　nature　bas　been　taken　as　identical　with　what　is　practical　according　to　the　concept　of　freedom；　with　the　result　that　a　division　has　been　made　under　these　heads　of　theoretical　and　practical；　by　which；　in　effect；　there　has　been　no　division　at　all　（seeing　that　both　parts　might　have　similar　principles）。　　　The　will…for　this　is　what　is　said…is　the　faculty　of　desire　and；　as　such；　is　just　one　of　the　many　natural　causes　in　the　world；　the　one；　namely；　which　acts　by　concepts；　and　whatever　is　represented　as　possible　（or　necessary）　through　the　efficacy　of　will　is　called　practically　possible　（or　necessary）：　the　intention　being　to　distinguish　its　possibility　（or　necessity）　from　the　physical　possibility　or　necessity　of　an　effect　the　causality　of　whose　cause　is　not　determined　to　its　production　by　concepts　（but　rather；　as　with　lifeless　matter；　by　mechanism；　and；　as　with　the　lower　animals；　by　instinct）。　Now；　the　question　in　respect　of　the　practical　faculty：　whether；　that　is　to　say；　the　concept；　by　which　the　causality　of　the　will　gets　its　rule；　is　a　concept　of　nature　or　of　freedom；　is　here　left　quite　open。　　　The　latter　distinction；　however；　is　essential。　For；　let　the　concept　determining　the　causality　be　a　concept　of　nature；　and　then　the　principles　are　technically…practical；　but；　let　it　be　a　concept　of　freedom；　and　they　are　morally…practical。　Now；　in　the　division　of　a　rational　science　the　difference　between　objects　that　require　different　principles　for　their　cognition　is　the　difference　on　which　everything　turns。　Hence　technically…practical　principles　belong　to　theoretical　philosophy　（natural　science）；　whereas　those　morally…practical　alone　form　the　second　part；　that　is；　practical　philosophy　（ethical　science）。　　　All　technically…practical　rules　（i。e。；　those　of　art　and　skill　generally；　or　even　of　prudence；　as　a　skill　in　exercising　an　influence　over　men　and　their　wills）　must；　so　far　as　their　principles　rest　upon　concepts；　be　reckoned　only　as　corollaries　to　theoretical　philosophy。　For　they　only　touch　the　possibility　of　things　according　to　concepts　of　nature；　and　this　embraces；　not　alone　the　means　discoverable　in　nature　for　the　purpose；　but　even　the　will　itself　（as　a　faculty　of　desire；　and　consequently　a　natural　faculty）；　so　far　as　it　is　determinable　on　these　rules　by　natural　motives。　Still　these　practical　rules　are　not　called　laws　（like　physical　laws）；　but　only　precepts。　This　is　due　to　the　fact　that　the　will　does　not　stand　simply　under　the　natural　concept；　but　also　under　the　concept　of　freedom。　In　the　latter　connection　its　principles　are　called　laws；　and　these　principles；　with　the　addition　of　what　follows　them；