the critique of judgement-第26部分

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n　consequences　than　that　of　its　beauty。　It　gives　on　the　whole　no　indication　of　anything　final　in　nature　itself；　but　only　in　the　possible　employment　of　our　intuitions　of　it　in　inducing　a　feeling　in　our　own　selves　of　a　finality　quite　independent　of　nature。　For　the　beautiful　in　nature　we　must　seek　a　ground　external　to　ourselves；　but　for　the　sublime　one　merely　in　ourselves　and　the　attitude　of　mind　that　introduces　sublimity　into　the　representation　of　nature。　This　is　a　very　needful　preliminary　remark。　It　entirely　separates　the　ideas　of　the　sublime　from　that　of　a　finality　of　nature；　and　makes　the　theory　of　the　sublime　a　mere　appendage　to　the　aesthetic　estimate　of　the　finality　of　nature；　because　it　does　not　give　a　representation　of　any　particular　form　in　nature；　but　involves　no　more　than　the　development　of　a　final　employment　by　the　imagination　of　its　own　representation。

　　　　　　　SS　24。　Subdivision　of　an　investigation　of　the　feeling　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　the　sublime。

　　In　the　division　of　the　moments　of　an　aesthetic　estimate　of　objects　in　respect　of　the　feeling　of　the　sublime；　the　course　of　the　Analytic　will　be　able　to　follow　the　same　principle　as　in　the　analysis　of　judgements　of　taste。　For；　the　judgement　being　one　of　the　aesthetic　reflective　judgement；　the　delight　in　the　sublime；　just　like　that　in　the　beautiful；　must　in　its　quantity　be　shown　to　be　universally　valid；　in　its　quality　independent　of　interest；　in　its　relation　subjective　finality；　and　the　latter；　in　its　modality；　necessary。　Hence　the　method　here　will　not　depart　from　the　lines　followed　in　the　preceding　section：　unless　something　is　made　of　the　point　that　there；　where　the　aesthetic　judgement　bore　on　the　form　of　the　object；　we　began　with　the　investigation　of　its　quality；　whereas　here；　considering　the　formlessness　that　may　belong　to　what　we　call　sublime；　we　begin　with　that　of　its　quantity；　as　first　moment　of　the　aesthetic　judgement　on　the　sublime…a　divergence　of　method　the　reason　for　which　is　evident　from　SS　23。　　　But　the　analysis　of　the　sublime　obliges　a　division　not　required　by　that　of　the　beautiful；　namely　one　into　the　mathematically　and　the　dynamically　sublime。　　　For　the　feeling　of　sublime　involves　as　its　characteristic　feature　a　mental　movement　combined　with　the　estimate　of　the　object；　whereas　taste　in　respect　of　the　beautiful　presupposes　that　the　mind　is　in　restful　contemplation；　and　preserves　it　in　this　state。　But　this　movement　has　to　be　estimated　as　subjectively　final　（since　the　sublime　pleases）。　Hence　it　is　referred　through　the　imagination　either　to　the　faculty　of　cognition　or　to　that　of　desire；　but　to　whichever　faculty　the　reference　is　made；　the　finality　of　the　given　representation　is　estimated　only　in　respect　of　these　faculties　（apart　from　end　or　interest）。　Accordingly　the　first　is　attributed　to　the　object　as　a　mathematical；　the　second　as　a　dynamical；　affection　of　the　imagination。　Hence　we　get　the　above　double　mode　of　representing　an　object　as　sublime。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　A。　THE　MATHEMATICALLY　SUBLIME。　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　25。　Definition　of　the　term　〃sublime〃。

　　Sublime　is　the　name　given　to　what　is　absolutely　great。　But　to　be　great　and　to　be　a　magnitude　are　entirely　different　concepts　（magnitudo　and　quantitas）。　In　the　same　way；　to　assert　without　qualification　（simpliciter）　that　something　is　great　is　quite　a　different　thing　from　saying　that　it　is　absolutely　great　（absolute；　non　comparative　magnum）。　The　latter　is　what　is　beyond　all　comparison　great。　What；　then；　is　the　meaning　of　the　assertion　that　anything　is　great；　or　small；　or　of　medium　size？　What　is　indicated　is　not　a　pure　concept　of　understanding；　still　less　an　intuition　of　sense；　and　just　as　little　is　it　a　concept　of　reason；　for　it　does　not　import　any　principle　of　cognition。　It　must；　therefore；　be　a　concept　of　judgement；　or　have　its　source　in　one；　and　must　introduce　as　basis　of　the　judgement　a　subjective　finality　of　the　representation　with　reference　to　the　power　of　judgement。　Given　a　multiplicity　of　the　homogeneous　together　constituting　one　thing；　and　we　may　at　once　cognize　from　the　thing　itself　that　it　is　a　magnitude　（quantum）。　No　comparison　with　other　things　is　required。　But　to　determine　how　great　it　is　always　requires　something　else；　which　itself　has　magnitude；　for　its　measure。　Now；　since　in　the　estimate　of　magnitude　we　have　to　take　into　account　not　merely　the　multiplicity　（number　of　units）　but　also　the　magnitude　of　the　unit　（the　measure）；　and　since　the　magnitude　of　this　unit　in　turn　always　requires　something　else　as　its　measure　and　as　the　standard　of　its　comparison；　and　so　on；　we　see　that　the　computation　of　the　magnitude　of　phenomena　is；　in　all　cases；　utterly　incapable　of　affording　us　any　absolute　concept　of　a　magnitude；　and　can；　instead；　only　afford　one　that　is　always　based　on　comparison。　　　If；　now；　I　assert　without　qualification　that　anything　is　great；　it　would　seem　that　I　have　nothing　in　the　way　of　a　comparison　present　to　my　mind；　or　at　least　nothing　involving　an　objective　measure；　for　no　attempt　is　thus　made　to　determine　how　great　the　object　is。　But；　despite　the　standard　of　comparison　being　merely　subjective；　the　claim　of　the　judgement　is　none　the　less　one　to　universal　agreement；　the　judgements：　〃that　man　is　beautiful〃　and　〃He　is　tall〃；　do　not　purport　to　speak　only　for　the　judging　subject；　but；　like　theoretical　judgements；　they　demand　the　assent　of　everyone。　　　Now　in　a　judgement　that　without　qualification　describes　anything　as　great；　it　is　not　merely　meant　that　the　object　has　a　magnitude；　but　greatness　is　ascribed　to　it　pre…eminently　among　many　other　objects　of　a　like　kind；　yet　without　the　extent　of　this　pre…eminence　being　determined。　Hence　a　standard　is　certainly　laid　at　the　basis　of　the　judgement；　which　standard　is　presupposed　to　be　one　that　can　be　taken　as　the　same　for　every　one；　but　which　is　available　only　for　an　aesthetic　estimate　of　the　greatness；　and　not　for　one　that　is　logical　（mathematically　determined）；　for　the　standard　is　a　merely　subjective　one　underlying　the　reflective　judgement　upon　the　greatness。　Furthermore；　this　standard　may　be　empirical；　as；　let　us　say；　the　average　size　of　the　men　known　to　us；　of　animals　of　a　certain　kind；　of　trees；　of　houses；　of　mountains；　and　so　forth。　Or　it　may　be　a　standard　given　a　priori；　which　by　reason　of　the　imperfections　of　the　judging　subject　is　restricted　to　subjective　conditions　of　presentation　in　concreto；　as；　in　the　practical　sphere；　the　greatness　of　a　particular　virtue；　or　of　public　liberty　and　justice　in　a　country；　or；　in　the　theoretical　sphere；　the　greatness　of　the　accuracy　or　inaccuracy　of　an　experiment　or　measurement；　etc。　　　Here；　now；　it　is　of　note　that；　although　we　have　no　interest　whatever　in　the　object；　i。e。；　its　real　existence　may　be　a　matter　of　no　concern　to　us；　still　its　mere　greatness；　regarded　even　as　devoid　of　form；　is　able　to　convey　a　universally　communicable　delight　and　so　involve　the　consciousness　of　a　subjective　finality　in　the　employment　of　our　cognitive　faculties；　but　not；　be　it　remembered；　a　delight　in　the　object；　for　the　latter　may　be　formless；　but；　in　contradistinction　to　what　is　the　case　with　the　beautiful；　where　the　reflective　judgement　finds　itself　set　to　a　key　that　is　final　in　respect　of　cognition　generally；　a　delight　in　an　extensio