the critique of judgement-第38部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


entation）；　i。e。；　upon　his　own　taste；　and　yet　is　also　not　to　be　derived　from　concepts；　then　it　follows　that　such　a　judgement…and　such　the　judgement　of　taste　in　fact　is…has　a　double　and　also　logical　peculiarity。　For；　first；　it　has　universal　validity　a　priori；　yet　without　having　a　logical　universality　according　to　concepts；　but　only　the　universality　of　a　singular　judgement。　Secondly；　it　has　a　necessity　（which　must　invariably　rest　upon　a　priori　grounds）；　but　one　which　depends　upon　no　a　priori　proofs　by　the　representation　of　which　it　would　be　competent　to　enforce　the　assent　which　the　judgement　of　taste　demands　of　every　one。　　　The　solution　of　these　logical　peculiarities；　which　distinguish　a　judgement　of　taste　from　all　cognitive　judgements；　will　of　itself　suffice　for　a　deduction　of　this　strange　faculty；　provided　we　abstract　at　the　outset　from　all　content　of　the　judgement；　viz。；　from　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　and　merely　compare　the　aesthetic　form　with　the　form　of　objective　judgements　as　prescribed　by　logic。　We　shall　first　try；　with　the　help　of　examples；　to　illustrate　and　bring　out　these　characteristic　properties　of　taste。

　　　　　　　SS　32。　First　peculiarity　of　the　judgement　of　taste。

　　The　judgement　of　taste　determines　its　object　in　respect　of　delight　（as　a　thing　of　beauty）　with　a　claim　to　the　agreement　of　every　one；　just　as　if　it　were　objective。　　　To　say：　〃this　flower　is　beautiful　is　tantamount　to　repeating　its　own　proper　claim　to　the　delight　of　everyone。　The　agreeableness　of　its　smell　gives　it　no　claim　at　all。　One　man　revels　in　it；　but　it　gives　another　a　headache。　Now　what　else　are　we　to　suppose　from　this　than　that　its　beauty　is　to　be　taken　for　a　property　of　the　flower　itself　which　does　not　adapt　itself　to　the　diversity　of　heads　and　the　individual　senses　of　the　multitude；　but　to　which　they　must　adapt　themselves；　if　they　are　going　to　pass　judgement　upon　it。　And　yet　this　is　not　the　way　the　matter　stands。　For　the　judgement　of　taste　consists　precisely　in　a　thing　being　called　beautiful　solely　in　respect　of　that　quality　in　which　it　adapts　itself　to　our　mode　of　taking　it　in。　　　Besides；　every　judgement　which　is　to　show　the　taste　of　the　individual；　is　required　to　be　an　independent　judgement　of　the　individual　himself。　There　must　be　no　need　of　groping　about　among　other　people's　judgements　and　getting　previous　instruction　from　their　delight　in　or　aversion　to　the　same　object。　Consequently　his　judgement　should　be　given　out　a　priori；　and　not　as　an　imitation　relying　on　the　general　pleasure　a　thing　gives　as　a　matter　of　fact。　One　would　think；　however；　that　a　judgement　a　priori　must　involve　a　concept　of　the　object　for　the　cognition　of　which　it　contains　the　principle。　But　the　judgement　of　taste　is　not　founded　on　concepts；　and　is　in　no　way　a　cognition；　but　only　an　aesthetic　judgement。　　　Hence　it　is　that　a　youthful　poet　refuses　to　allow　himself　to　be　dissuaded　from　the　conviction　that　his　poem　is　beautiful；　either　by　the　judgement　of　the　public　or　of　his　friends。　And　even　if　he　lends　them　an　ear；　he　does　so；…not　because　he　has　now　come　to　a　different　judgement；　but　because；　though　the　whole　public；　at　least　so　far　as　his　work　is　concerned；　should　have　false　taste；　he　still；　in　his　desire　for　recognition；　finds　good　reason　to　accommodate　himself　to　the　popular　error　（even　against　his　own　judgement）。　It　is　only　in　aftertime；　when　his　judgement　has　been　sharpened　by　exercise；　that　of　his　own　free　will　and　accord　he　deserts　his　former　judgements　behaving　in　just　the　same　way　as　with　those　of　his　judgements　which　depend　wholly　upon　reason。　Taste　lays　claim　simply　to　autonomy。　To　make　the　judgements　of　others　the　determining　ground　of　one's　own　would　be　heteronomy。　　　The　fact　that　we　recommend　the　works　of　the　ancients　as　models；　and　rightly　too；　and　call　their　authors　classical；　as　constituting　sort　of　nobility　among　writers　that　leads　the　way　and　thereby　gives　laws　to　the　people；　seems　to　indicate　a　posteriori　sources　of　taste　and　to　contradict　the　autonomy　of　taste　in　each　individual。　But　we　might　just　as　well　say　that　the　ancient　mathematicians；　who；　to　this　day；　are　looked　upon　as　the　almost　indispensable　models　of　perfect　thoroughness　and　elegance　in　synthetic　methods；　prove　that　reason　also　is　on　our　part　only　imitative；　and　that　it　is　incompetent　with　the　deepest　intuition　to　produce　of　itself　rigorous　proofs　by　means　of　the　construction　of　concepts。　There　is　no　employment　of　our　powers；　no　matter　how　free；　not　even　of　reason　itself　（which　must　create　all　its　judgements　from　the　common　a　priori　source）；　which；　if　each　individual　had　always　to　start　afresh　with　the　crude　equipment　of　his　natural　state；　would　not　get　itself　involved　in　blundering　attempts；　did　not　those　of　others　tie　before　it　as　a　warning。　Not　that　predecessors　make　those　who　follow　in　their　steps　mere　imitators；　but　by　their　methods　they　set　others　upon　the　track　of　seeking　in　themselves　for　the　principles；　and　so　of　adopting　their　own；　often　better；　course。　Even　in　religion…where　undoubtedly　every　one　bas　to　derive　his　rule　of　conduct　from　himself；　seeing　that　he　himself　remains　responsible　for　it　and；　when　he　goes　wrong；　cannot　shift　the　blame　upon　others　as　teachers　or　leaders…general　precepts　learned　at　the　feet　either　of　priests　or　philosophers；　or　even　drawn　from　ones'　own　resources；　are　never　so　efficacious　as　an　example　of　virtue　or　holiness；　which；　historically　portrayed；　does　not　dispense　with　the　autonomy　of　virtue　drawn　from　the　spontaneous　and　original　idea　of　morality　（a　priori）；　or　convert　this　into　a　mechanical　process　of　imitation。　Following　which　has　reference　to　a　precedent；　and　not　imitation；　is　the　proper　expression　for　all　influence　which　the　products　of　an　exemplary　author　may　exert　upon　others　and　this　means　no　more　than　going　to　the　same　sources　for　a　creative　work　as　those　to　which　he　went　for　his　creations；　and　learning　from　one's　predecessor　no　more　than　the　mode　of　availing　oneself　of　such　sources。　Taste；　just　because　its　judgement　cannot　be　determined　by　concepts　or　precepts；　is　among　all　faculties　and　talents　the　very　one　that　stands　most　in　need　of　examples　of　what　has　in　the　course　of　culture　maintained　itself　longest　in　esteem。　Thus　it　avoids　an　early　lapse　into　crudity　and　a　return　to　the　rudeness　of　its　earliest　efforts。

　　　　　SS　33。　Second　peculiarity　of　the　judgement　of　taste。

　　Proofs　are　of　no　avail　whatever　for　determining　the　judgement　of　taste；　and　in　this　connection　matters　stand　just　as　they　would　were　that　judgement　simply　subjective。　　　If　any　one　does　not　think　a　building；　view；　or　poem　beautiful；　then；　in　the　first　place；　he　refuses；　so　far　as　his　inmost　conviction　goes；　to　allow　approval　to　be　wrung　from　him　by　a　hundred　voices　all　lauding　it　to　the　skies。　Of　course　he　may　affect　to　be　pleased　with　it；　so　as　not　to　be　considered　as　wanting　in　taste。　He　may　even　begin　to　harbour　doubts　as　to　whether　he　has　formed　his　taste　upon　an　acquaintance　with　a　sufficient　number　of　objects　of　a　particular　kind　（just　as　one　who　in　the　distance　recognizes；　as　he　believes；　something　as　a　wood　which　every　one　else　regards　as　a　town；　becomes　doubtful　of　the　judgement　of　his　own　eyesight）。　But；　for　all　that；　he　clearly　perceives　that　the　approval　of　oth