the critique of judgement-第5部分

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realizing　the　object　（by　the　intervention　of　means；　therefore）　or　else　are　addressed　to　what　is　quite　impossible；　as；　for　example；　to　undo　the　past　（O　mihi　praeteritos；　etc。）　or；　to　be　able　to　annihilate　the　interval　that；　with　intolerable　delay；　divides　us　from　the　wished　for　moment。　…Now；　conscious　as　we　are　in　such　fantastic　desires　of　the　inefficiency　of　our　representations　（or　even　of　their　futility）；　as　causes　of　their　objects；　there　is　still　involved　in　every　wish　a　reference　of　the　same　as　cause；　and　therefore　the　representation　of　its　causality；　and　this　is　especially　discernible　where　the　wish；　as　longing；　is　an　affection。　For　such　affections；　since　they　dilate　the　heart　and　render　it　inert　and　thus　exhaust　its　powers；　show　that　a　strain　is　kept　on　being　exerted　and　re…exerted　on　these　powers　by　the　representations；　but　that　the　mind　is　allowed　continually　to　relapse　and　get　languid　upon　recognition　of　the　impossibility　before　it。　Even　prayers　for　the　aversion　of　great；　and；　so　far　as　we　can　see；　inevitable　evils；　and　many　superstitious　means　for　attaining　ends　impossible　of　attainment　by　natural　means；　prove　the　causal　reference　of　representations　to　their　objects…a　causality　which　not　even　the　consciousness　of　inefficiency　for　producing　the　effect　can　deter　from　straining　towards　it。　But　why　our　nature　should　be　furnished　with　a　propensity　to　consciously　vain　desires　is　a　teleological　problem　of　anthropology。　It　would　seem　that　were　we　not　to　be　determined　to　the　exertion　of　our　power　before　we　had　assured　ourselves　of　the　efficiency　of　our　faculty　for　producing　an　object；　our　power　would　remain　to　a　large　extent　unused。　For　as　a　rule　we　only　first　learn　to　know　our　powers　by　making　trial　of　them。　This　deceit　of　vain　desires　is　therefore　only　the　result　of　a　beneficent　disposition　in　our　nature。

　　Hence；　despite　the　fact　of　philosophy　being　only　divisible　into　two　principal　parts；　the　theoretical　and　the　practical；　and　despite　the　fact　of　all　that　we　may　have　to　say　of　the　special　principles　of　judgement　having　to　be　assigned　to　its　theoretical　part；　i。e。；　to　rational　cognition　according　to　concepts　of　nature：　still　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　which　must　settle　this　whole　question　before　the　above　system　is　taken　in　hand；　so　as　to　substantiate　its　possibility；　consists　of　three　parts：　the　Critique　of　pure　understanding；　of　pure　judgement；　and　of　pure　reason；　which　faculties　are　called　pure　on　the　ground　of　their　being　legislative　a　priori。

　　　　　　　　　IV。　Judgement　as　a　Faculty　by　which　Laws　are　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　prescribed　a　priori。

　　Judgement　in　general　is　the　faculty　of　thinking　the　particular　as　contained　under　the　universal。　If　the　universal　（the　rule；　principle；　or　law）　is　given；　then　the　judgement　which　subsumes　the　particular　under　it　is　determinant。　This　is　so　even　where　such　a　judgement　is　transcendental　and；　as　such；　provides　the　conditions　a　priori　in　conformity　with　which　alone　subsumption　under　that　universal　can　be　effected。　If；　however；　only　the　particular　is　given　and　the　universal　has　to　be　found　for　it；　then　the　judgement　is　simply　reflective。　　　The　determinant　judgement　determines　under　universal　transcendental　laws　furnished　by　understanding　and　is　subsumptive　only；　the　law　is　marked　out　for　it　a　priori；　and　it　has　no　need　to　devise　a　law　for　its　own　guidance　to　enable　it　to　subordinate　the　particular　in　nature　to　the　universal。　But　there　are　such　manifold　forms　of　nature；　so　many　modifications；　as　it　were；　of　the　universal　transcendental　concepts　of　nature；　left　undetermined　by　the　laws　furnished　by　pure　understanding　a　priori　as　above　mentioned；　and　for　the　reason　that　these　laws　only　touch　the　general　possibility　of　a　nature　（as　an　object　of　sense）；　that　there　must　needs　also　be　laws　in　this　behalf。　These　laws；　being　empirical；　may　be　contingent　as　far　as　the　light　of　our　understanding　goes；　but　still；　if　they　are　to　be　called　laws　（as　the　concept　of　a　nature　requires）；　they　must　be　regarded　as　necessary　on　a　principle；　unknown　though　it　be　to　us；　of　the　unity　of　the　manifold。　The　reflective　judgement　which　is　compelled　to　ascend　from　the　particular　in　nature　to　the　universal　stands；　therefore；　in　need　of　a　principle。　This　principle　it　cannot　borrow　from　experience；　because　what　it　has　to　do　is　to　establish　just　the　unity　of　all　empirical　principles　under　higher；　though　likewise　empirical；　principles；　and　thence　the　possibility　of　the　systematic　subordination　of　higher　and　lower。　Such　a　transcendental　principle；　therefore；　the　reflective　judgement　can　only　give　as　a　law　from　and　to　itself。　It　cannot　derive　it　from　any　other　quarter　（as　it　would　then　be　a　determinant　judgement）。　Nor　can　it　prescribe　it　to　nature；　for　reflection　on　the　laws　of　nature　adjusts　itself　to　nature；　and　not　nature　to　the　conditions　according　to　which　we　strive　to　obtain　a　concept　of　it…a　concept　that　is　quite　contingent　in　respect　of　these　conditions。　　　Now　the　principle　sought　can　only　be　this：　as　universal　laws　of　nature　have　their　ground　in　our　understanding；　which　prescribes　them　to　nature　（though　only　according　to　the　universal　concept　of　it　as　nature）；　particular　empirical　laws　must　be　regarded；　in　respect　of　that　which　is　left　undetermined　in　them　by　these　universal　laws；　according　to　a　unity　such　as　they　would　have　if　an　understanding　（though　it　be　not　ours）　had　supplied　them　for　the　benefit　of　our　cognitive　faculties；　so　as　to　render　possible　a　system　of　experience　according　to　particular　natural　laws。　This　is　not　to　be　taken　as　implying　that　such　an　understanding　must　be　actually　assumed　（for　it　is　only　the　reflective　judgement　which　avails　itself　of　this　idea　as　a　principle　for　the　purpose　of　reflection　and　not　for　determining　anything）；　but　this　faculty　rather　gives　by　this　means　a　law　to　itself　alone　and　not　to　nature。　　　Now　the　concept　of　an　object；　so　far　as　it　contains　at　the　same　time　the　ground　of　the　actuality　of　this　object；　is　called　its　end；　and　the　agreement　of　a　thing　with　that　constitution　of　things　which　is　only　possible　according　to　ends；　is　called　the　finality　of　its　form。　Accordingly　the　principle　of　judgement；　in　respect　of　the　form　of　the　things　of　nature　under　empirical　laws　generally；　is　the　finality　of　nature　in　its　multiplicity。　In　other　words；　by　this　concept　nature　is　represented　as　if　an　understanding　contained　the　ground　of　the　unity　of　the　manifold　of　its　empirical　laws。　　　The　finality　of　nature　is；　therefore；　a　particular　a　priori　concept；　which　bas　its　origin　solely　in　the　reflective　judgement。　For　we　cannot　ascribe　to　the　products　of　nature　anything　like　a　reference　of　nature　in　them　to　ends；　but　we　can　only　make　use　of　this　concept　to　reflect　upon　them　in　respect　of　the　nexus　of　phenomena　in　nature…a　nexus　given　according　to　empirical　laws。　Furthermore；　this　concept　is　entirely　different　from　practical　finality　（in　human　art　or　even　morals）；　though　it　is　doubtless　thought　after　this　analogy。

　　　　　　　V。　The　Principle　of　the　formal　finality　of　Nature　is　a　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　transcendental　Principle　of　Judgement。

　　A　transcendental　principle　is　one　through　which　we　represent　a　priori　the　universal　condition　under　which　alone　things　can　become　objects　of　our　cognition　ge