the critique of judgement-第51部分

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　judgement。　Now；　imagination　rather　entitles　an　art　to　be　called　an　inspired　（geistreiche）　than　a　fine　art。　It　is　only　in　respect　of　judgement　that　the　name　of　fine　art　is　deserved。　Hence　it　follows　that　judgement；　being　the　indispensable　condition　（conditio　sine　qua　non）；　is　at　least　what　one　must　look　to　as　of　capital　importance　in　forming　an　estimate　of　art　as　fine　art。　So　far　as　beauty　is　concerned；　to　be　fertile　and　original　in　ideas　is　not　such　an　imperative　requirement　as　it　is　that　the　imagination　in　its　freedom　should　be　in　accordance　with　the　understanding's　conformity　to　law。　For；　in　lawless　freedom；　imagination；　with　all　its　wealth；　produces　nothing　but　nonsense；　the　power　of　judgement；　on　the　other　hand；　is　the　faculty　that　makes　it　consonant　with　understanding。　　　Taste；　like　judgement　in　general；　is　the　discipline　（or　corrective）　of　genius。　It　severely　clips　its　wings；　and　makes　it　orderly　or　polished；　but　at　the　same　time　it　gives　it　guidance　directing　and　controlling　its　flight；　so　that　it　may　preserve　its　character　of　finality。　It　introduces　a　clearness　and　order　into　the　plenitude　of　thought；　and　in　so　doing　gives　stability　to　the　ideas；　and　qualifies　them　at　once　for　permanent　and　universal　approval；　for　being　followed　by　others；　and　for　a　continually　progressive　culture。　And　so；　where　the　interests　of　both　these　qualities　clash　in　a　product；　and　there　has　to　be　a　sacrifice　of　something；　then　it　should　rather　be　on　the　side　of　genius；　and　judgement；　which　in　matters　of　fine　art　bases　its　decision　on　its　own　proper　principles；　will　more　readily　endure　an　abatement　of　the　freedom　and　wealth　of　the　imagination　than　that　the　understanding　should　be　compromised。　　　The　requisites　for　fine　art　are；　therefore；　imagination；　understanding；　soul；　and　taste。*

　　*The　first　three　faculties　are　first　brought　into　union　by　means　of　the　fourth。　Hume；　in　his　history；　informs　the　English　that　although　they　are　second　in　their　works　to　no　other　people　in　the　world　in　respect　the　evidences　they　afford　of　the　three　first　qualities　separately　considered；　still　in　what　unites　them　they　must　yield　to　their　neighbours；　the　French。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　51。　The　division　of　the　fine　arts。

　　Beauty　（whether　it　be　of　nature　or　of　art）　may　in　general　be　termed　the　expression　of　aesthetic　ideas。　But　the　provision　must　be　added　that　with　beauty　of　art　this　idea　must　be　excited　through　the　medium　of　a　concept　of　the　object；　whereas　with　beauty　of　nature　the　bare　reflection　upon　a　given　intuition；　apart　from　any　concept　of　what　the　object　is　intended　to　be；　is　sufficient　for　awakening　and　communicating　the　idea　of　which　that　object　is　regarded　as　the　expression。　　　Accordingly；　if　we　wish　to　make　a　division　of　the　fine　arts；　we　can　choose　for　that　purpose；　tentatively　at　least；　no　more　convenient　principle　than　the　analogy　which　art　bears　to　the　mode　of　expression　of　which　men　avail　themselves　in　speech　with　a　view　to　communicating　themselves　to　one　another　as　completely　as　possible；　i。e。；　not　merely　in　respect　of　their　concepts　but　in　respect　of　their　sensations　also。*　Such　expression　consists　in　word；　gesture；　and　tone　（articulation；　gesticulation；　and　modulation）。　It　is　the　combination　of　these　three　modes　of　expression　which　alone　constitutes　a　complete　communication　of　the　speaker。　For　thought；　intuition；　and　sensation　are　in　this　way　conveyed　to　others　simultaneously　and　in　conjunction。

　　*The　reader　is　not　to　consider　this　scheme　for　a　possible　division　of　the　fine　arts　as　a　deliberate　theory。　It　is　only　one　of　the　various　attempts　that　can　and　ought　to　be　made。

　　Hence　there　are　only　three　kinds　of　fine　art：　the　art　of　speech；　formative　art；　and　the　art　of　the　play　of　sensations　（as　external　sense　impressions）。　This　division　might　also　be　arranged　as　a　dichotomy；　so　that　fine　art　would　be　divided　into　that　of　the　expression　of　thoughts　or　intuitions；　the　latter　being　subdivided　according　to　the　distinction　between　the　form　and　the　matter　（sensation）。　It　would；　however；　in　that　case　appear　too　abstract；　and　less　in　line　with　popular　concepztions。　　　（1）　The　arts　of　speech　are　rhetoric　and　poetry。　Rhetoric　is　the　art　of　transacting　a　serious　business　of　the　understanding　as　if　it　were　a　free　play　of　the　imagination；　poetry　that　of　conducting　a　free　play　of　the　imagination　as　if　it　were　a　serious　business　of　the　understanding。　　　Thus　the　orator　announces　a　serious　business；　and　for　the　purpose　of　entertaining　his　audience　conducts　it　as　if　it　were　a　mere　play　with　ideas。　The　poet　promises　merely　an　entertaining　play　with　ideas；　and　yet　for　the　understanding　there　enures　as　much　as　if　the　promotion　of　its　business　had　been　his　one　intention。　The　combination　and　harmony　of　the　two　faculties　of　cognition；　sensibility　and　understanding；　which；　though　doubtless　indispensable　to　one　another；　do　not　readily　permit　of　being　united　without　compulsion　and　reciprocal　abatement；　must　have　the　appearance　of　being　undesigned　and　a　spontaneous　occurrence…otherwise　it　is　not　fine　art。　For　this　reason　what　is　studied　and　laboured　must　be　here　avoided。　For　fine　art　must　be　free　art　in　a　double　sense：　i。e。；　not　alone　in　a　sense　opposed　to　contract　work；　as　not　being　a　work　the　magnitude　of　which　may　be　estimated；　exacted；　or　paid　for；　according　to　a　definite　standard；　but　free　also　in　the　sense　that；　while　the　mind；　no　doubt；　occupies　itself；　still　it　does　so　without　ulterior　regard　to　any　other　end；　and　yet　with　a　feeling　of　satisfaction　and　stimulation　（independent　of　reward）。　　　The　orator；　therefore；　gives　something　which　he　does　not　promise；　viz。；　an　entertaining　play　of　the　imagination。　On　the　other　hand；　there　is　something　in　which　he　fails　to　come　up　to　his　promise；　and　a　thing；　too；　which　is　his　avowed　business；　namely；　the　engagement　of　the　understanding　to　some　end。　The　poet's　promise；　on　the　contrary；　is　a　modest　one；　and　a　mere　play　with　ideas　is　all　he　holds　out　to　us；　but　he　accomplishes　something　worthy　of　being　made　a　serious　business；　namely；　the　using　of　play　to　provide　food　for　the　understanding；　and　the　giving　of　life　to　its　concepts　by　means　of　the　imagination。　Hence　the　orator　in　reality　performs　less　than　he　promises；　the　poet　more。　　　（2）　The　formative　arts；　or　those　for　the　expression　of　ideas　in　sensuous　intuition　（not　by　means　of　representations　of　mere　imagination　that　are　excited　by　words）　are　arts　either　of　sensuous　truth　or　of　sensuous　semblance。　The　first　is　called　plastic　art；　the　second　painting。　Both　use　figures　in　space　for　the　expression　of　ideas：　the　former　makes　figures　discernible　to　two　senses；　sight　and　touch　（though；　so　far　as　the　latter　sense　is　concerned；　without　regard　to　beauty）；　the　latter　makes　them　so　to　the　former　sense　alone。　The　aesthetic　idea　（archetype；　original）　is　the　fundamental　basis　of　both　in　the　imagination；　but　the　figure　which　constitutes　its　expression　（the　ectype；　the　copy）　is　given　either　in　its　bodily　extension　（the　way　the　object　itself　exists）　or　else　in　accordance　with　the　picture　which　it　forms　of　itself　in　the　eye　（according　to　its　appearance　when　projected　on　a　flat　surface）。　Or；　whatever　the　archetype　is；　either　the　reference　to　an　actual　end　or　only　the　semblance　of　one　may　be　im