the critique of judgement-第60部分

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nt　of　taste　is　in　fact　a　disguised　judgement　of　reason　on　the　perfection　discovered　in　a　thing　and　the　reference　of　the　manifold　in　it　to　an　end；　and　that　it　is　consequently　only　called　aesthetic　on　account　of　the　confusion　that　here　besets　our　reflection；　although　fundamentally　it　is　teleological。　In　this　latter　case　the　solution　of　the　antinomy　with　the　assistance　of　transcendental　ideas　might　be　declared　otiose　and　nugatory；　and　the　above　laws　of　taste　thus　reconciled　with　the　objects　of　sense；　not　as　mere　phenomena；　but　even　as　things…in…themselves。　How　unsatisfactory　both　of　those　alternatives　alike　are　as　a　means　of　escape　has　been　shown　in　several　places　in　our　exposition　of　judgements　of　taste。　　　If；　however；　our　deduction　is　at　least　credited　with　having　been　worked　out　on　correct　lines；　even　though　it　may　not　have　been　sufficiently　clear　in　all　its　details；　three　ideas　then　stand　out　in　evidence。　Firstly；　there　is　the　supersensible　in　general；　without　further　determination；　as　substrate　of　nature；　secondly；　this　same　supersensible　as　principle　of　the　subjective　finality　of　nature　for　our　cognitive　faculties；　thirdly；　the　same　supersensible　again；　as　principle　of　the　ends　of　freedom；　and　principle　of　the　common　accord　of　these　ends　with　freedom　in　the　moral　sphere。

　　　　　　SS　58。　The　idealism　of　the　finality　alike　of　nature　　　　　　　　　　and　of　art；　as　the　unique　principle　of　the　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　aesthetic　judgement。

　　The　principle　of　taste　may；　to　begin　with；　be　placed　on　either　of　two　footings。　For　taste　may　be　said　invariably　to　judge　on　empirical　grounds　of　determination　and　such；　therefore；　as　are　only　given　a　posteriori　through　sense；　or　else　it　may　be　allowed　to　judge　on　an　a　priori　ground。　The　former　would　be　the　empiricism　of　the　critique　of　taste；　the　latter　its　rationalism。　The　first　would　obliterate　the　distinction　that　marks　off　the　object　of　our　delight　from　the　agreeable；　the　second；　supposing　the　judgement　rested　upon　determinate　concepts；　would　obliterate　its　distinction　from　the　good。　In　this　way　beauty　would　have　its　locus　standi　in　the　world　completely　denied；　and　nothing　but　the　dignity　of　a　separate　name；　betokening；　maybe；　a　certain　blend　of　both　the　above…named　kinds　of　delight；　would　be　left　in　its　stead。　But　we　have　shown　the　existence　of　grounds　of　delight　which　are　a　priori；　and　which　therefore；　can　consist　with　the　principle　of　rationalism；　and　which　are　yet　incapable　of　being　grasped　by　definite　concepts。　　　As　against　the　above；　we　may　say　that　the　rationalism　of　the　principle　of　taste　may　take　the　form　either　of　the　realism　of　finality　or　of　its　idealism。　Now；　as　a　judgement　of　taste　is　not　a　cognitive　judgement；　and　as　beauty　is　not　a　property　of　the　object　considered　in　its　own　account；　the　rationalism　of　the　principle　of　taste　can　never　be　placed　in　the　fact　that　the　finality　in　this　judgement　is　regarded　in　thought　as　objective。　In　other　words；　the　judgement　is　not　directed　theoretically；　nor；　therefore；　logically；　either　（no　matter　if　only　in　a　confused　estimate）；　to　the　perfection　of　the　object；　but　only　aesthetically　to　the　harmonizing　of　its　representation　in　the　imagination　with　the　essential　principles　of　judgement　generally　in　the　subject。　For　this　reason　the　judgement　of　taste；　and　the　distinction　between　its　realism　and　its　idealism；　can　only；　even　on　the　principle　of　rationalism；　depend　upon　its　subjective　finality　interpreted　in　one　or　other　of　two　ways。　Either　such　subjective　finality　is；　in　the　first　case；　a　harmony　with　our　judgement　pursued　as　an　actual　（intentional）　end　of　nature　（or　of　art）；　or　else；　in　the　second　case；　it　is　only　a　supervening　final　harmony　with　the　needs　of　our　faculty　of　judgement　in　its　relation　to　nature　and　the　forms　which　nature　produces　in　accordance　with　particular　laws；　and　one　that　is　independent　of　an　end；　spontaneous　and　contingent。　　　The　beautiful　forms　displayed　in　the　organic　world　all　plead　eloquently　on　the　side　of　the　realism　of　the　aesthetic　finality　of　nature　in　support　of　the　plausible　assumption　that　beneath　the　production　of　the　beautiful　there　must　lie　a　preconceived　idea　in　the　producing　cause…that　is　to　say　an　end　acting　in　the　interest　of　our　imagination。　Flowers；　blossoms；　even　the　shapes　of　plants　as　a　whole；　the　elegance　of　animal　formations　of　all　kinds；　unnecessary　for　the　discharge　of　any　function　on　their　part；　but　chosen　as　it　were　with　an　eye　to　our　taste；　and；　beyond　all　else；　the　variety　and　harmony　in　the　array　of　colours　（in　the　pheasant；　in　crustacea；　in　insects；　down　even　to　the　meanest　flowers）；　so　pleasing　and　charming　to　the　eyes；　but　which；　inasmuch　as　they　touch　the　bare　surf　ace；　and　do　not　even　here　in　any　way　all　act　the　structure；　of　these　creatures…a　matter　which　might　have　a　necessary　bearing　on　their　internal　ends…seem　to　be　planned　entirely　with　a　view　to　outward　appearance：　all　these　lend　great　weight　to　the　mode　of　explanation　which　assumes　actual　ends　of　nature　in　favour　of　our　aesthetic　judgement。　　　On　the　other　hand；　not　alone　does　reason；　with　its　maxims　enjoining　upon　us　in　all　cases　to　avoid；　as　far　as　possible；　any　unnecessary　multiplication　of　principles；　set　itself　against　this　assumption；　but　we　have　nature　in　its　free　formations　displaying　on　all　sides　extensive　mechanical　proclivity　to　producing　forms　seemingly　made；　as　it　were；　for　the　aesthetic　employment　of　our　judgement；　without　affording　the　least　support　to　the　supposition　of　a　need　for　anything　over　and　above　its　mechanism；　as　mere　nature；　to　enable　them　to　be　final　for　our　judgement　apart　from　their　being　grounded　upon　any　idea。　The　above　expression；　〃free　formations〃　of　nature；　is；　however；　here　used　to　denote　such　as　are　originally　set　up　in　a　fluid　at　rest　where　the　volatilization　or　separation　of　some　constituent　（sometimes　merely　of　caloric）　leaves　the　residue　on　solidification　to　assume　a　definite　shape　or　structure　（figure　or　texture）　which　differs　with　specific　differences　of　the　matter；　but　for　the　same　matter　is　invariable。　Here；　however；　it　is　taken　for　granted　that；　as　the　true　meaning　of　a　fluid　requires；　the　matter　in　the　fluid　is　completely　dissolved　and　not　a　mere　admixture　of　solid　particles　simply　held　there　in　suspension。　　　The　formation；　then；　takes　place　by　a　concursion；　i。e。；　by　a　sudden　solidification…　not　by　a　gradual　transition　from　the　fluid　to　the　solid　state；　but；　as　it　were；　by　a　leap。　This　transition　is　termed　crystallization。　Freezing　water　offers　the　most　familiar　instance　of　a　formation　of　this　kind。　There　the　process　begins　by　straight　threads　of　ice　forming。　These　unite　at　angles　of　60〃；　whilst　others　similarly　attach　themselves　to　them　at　every　point　until　the　whole　has　turned　into　ice。　But　while　this　is　going　on；　the　water　between　the　threads　of　ice　does　not　keep　getting　gradually　more　viscous；　but　remains　as　thoroughly　fluid　as　it　would　be　at　a　much　higher　temperature；　although　it　is　perfectly　ice…cold。　The　matter　that　frees　itself　that　makes　its　sudden　escape　at　the　moment　of　solidification…is　a　considerable　quantum　of　caloric。　As　this　was　merely　required　to　preserve　fluidity；　its　disappearance　leaves　the　existing　ice　not　a　whit　colder　than　the　water　which　but　a　moment　before　was　there　as