shorter logic-第17部分

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though　without　express　consciousness　of　it；　always　carry　it　with　us　and　always　use　it。　Language　is
the　main　depository　of　these　types　of　thought；　and　one　use　of　the　grammatical　instruction　which
children　receive　is　unconsciously　to　turn　their　attention　to　distinctions　of　thought。

Logic　is　usually　said　to　be　concerned　with　forms　only　and　to　derive　the　material　for　them　from
elsewhere。　But　this　'only'；　which　assumes　that　the　logical　thoughts　are　nothing　in　comparison　with
the　rest　of　the　contents；　is　not　the　word　to　use　about　forms　which　are　the　absolutely　real　ground　of
everything。　Everything　else　rather　is　an　'only'　compared　with　these　thoughts。　To　make　such
abstract　forms　a　problem　presupposes　in　the　inquirer　a　higher　level　of　culture　than　ordinary；　and　to
study　them　in　themselves　and　for　their　own　sake　signifies　in　addition　that　these　thought…types　must
be　deduced　out　of　thought　itself；　and　their　truth　or　reality　examined　by　the　light　of　their　own　laws。
We　do　not　assume　them　as　data　from　without；　and　then　define　them　or　exhibit　their　value　and
authority　by　comparing　them　with　the　shape　they　take　in　our　minds。　If　we　thus　acted；　we　should
proceed　from　observation　and　experience；　and　should；　for　instance；　say　we　habitually　employ　the
term　'force'　in　such　a　case；　and　such　a　meaning。　A　definition　like　that　would　be　called　correct；　if　it
agreed　with　the　conception　of　its　object　present　in　our　ordinary　state　of　mind。　The　defect　of　this
empirical　method　is　that　a　notion　is　not　defined　as　it　is　in　and　for　itself；　but　in　terms　of　something
assumed；　which　is　then　used　as　a　criterion　and　standard　of　correctness。　No　such　test　need　be
applied：　we　have　merely　to　let　the　thought…forms　follow　the　impulse　of　their　own　organic　life。　

To　ask　if　a　category　is　true　or　not；　must　sound　strange　to　the　ordinary　mind：　for　a　category
apparently　becomes　true　only　when　it　is　applied　to　a　given　object；　and　apart　from　this　application　it
would　seem　meaningless　to　inquire　into　the　truth。　But　this　is　the　very　question　on　which　every　thing
turns。　We　must　however　in　the　first　place　understand　clearly　what　we　mean　by　Truth。　In　common
life　truth　means　the　agreement　of　an　object　with　our　conception　of　it。　We　thus　presuppose　an
object　to　which　our　conception　must　conform。　In　the　philosophical　sense　of　the　word；　on　the　other
hand；　truth　may　be　described；　in　general　abstract　terms；　as　the　agreement　of　a　thought…content
with　itself。　This　meaning　is　quite　different　from　the　one　given　above。　At　the　same　time　the　deeper
and　philosophical　meaning　of　truth　can　be　partially　traced　even　in　the　ordinary　usage　of　language。
Thus　we　speak　of　a　true　friend；　by　which　we　mean　a　friend　whose　manner　of　conduct　accords
with　the　notion　of　friendship。　In　the　same　way　we　speak　of　a　true　work　of　Art。　Untrue　in　this　sense
means　the　same　as　bad；　or　self…discordant。　In　this　sense　a　bad　state　is　an　untrue　state；　and　evil　and
untruth　may　be　said　to　consist　in　the　contradiction　subsisting　between　the　function　or　notion　and
the　existence　of　the　object。　Of　such　a　bad　object　we　may　form　a　correct　representation；　but　the
import　of　such　representation　is　inherently　false。　Of　these　correctnesses；　which　are　at　the　same
time　untruths；　we　may　have　many　in　our　heads。　God　alone　is　the　thorough　harmony　of　notion　and
reality。　All　finite　things　involve　an　untruth：　they　have　a　notion　and　an　existence；　but　their　existence
does　not　meet　the　requirements　of　the　notion。　For　this　reason　they　must　perish；　and　then　the
incompatibility　between　their　notion　and　their　existence　becomes　manifest。　It　is　in　the　kind　that　the
individual　animal　has　its　notion；　and　the　kind　liberates　itself　from　this　individuality　by　death。

The　study　of　truth；　or；　as　it　is　here　explained　to　mean；　consistency；　constitutes　the　proper　problem
of　logic。　In　our　everyday　mind　we　are　never　troubled　with　questions　about　the　truth　of　the　forms　of
thought。　We　may　also　express　the　problem　of　logic　by　saying　that　it　examines　the　forms　of　thought
touching　their　capability　to　hold　truth。　And　the　question　comes　to　this：　What　are　the　forms　of　the
infinite；　and　what　are　the　forms　of　the　finite　？　Usually　no　suspicion　attaches　to　the　finite　forms　of
thought；　they　are　allowed　to　pass　unquestioned。　But　it　is　from　conforming　to　finite　categories　in
thought　and　action　that　all　deception　originates。　

（3）　Truth　may　be　ascertained　by　several　methods；　each　of　which　however　is　no　more　than　a　form。
Experience　is　the　first　of　these　methods。　But　the　method　is　only　a　form：　it　has　no　intrinsic　value　of
its　own。　For　in　experience　everything　depends　upon　the　mind　we　bring　to　bear　upon　actuality。　A
great　mind　is　great　in　its　experience；　and　in　the　motley　play　of　phenomena　at　once　perceives　the
point　of　real　significance。　The　idea　is　present；　in　actual　shape；　not　something；　as　it　were；　over　the
hill　and　far　away。　The　genius　of　a　Goethe；　for　example；　looking　into　nature　or　history；　has　great
experiences；　catches　sight　of　the　living　principle；　and　gives　expression　to　it。　
A　second　method　of　apprehending　the　truth　is　Reflection；　which　defines　it　by　intellectual　relations
of　condition　and　conditioned。　But　in　these　two　modes　the　absolute　truth　has　not　yet　found　its
appropriate　form。　The　most　perfect　method　of　knowledge　proceeds　in　the　pure　form　of　thought：
and　here　the　attitude　of　man　is　one　of　entire　freedom。

That　the　form　of　thought　is　the　perfect　form；　and　that　it　presents　the　truth　as　it　intrinsically　and
actually　is；　is　the　general　dogma　of　all　philosophy。　To　give　a　proof　of　the　dogma　there　is；　in　the　first
instance；　nothing　to　do　but　show　that　these　other　forms　of　knowledge　are　finite。　The　grand
Scepticism　of　antiquity　accomplished　this　task　when　it　exhibited　the　contradictions　contained　in
every　one　of　these　forms。　That　Scepticism　indeed　went　further：　but　when　it　ventured　to　assail　the
forms　of　reason；　it　began　by　insinuating　under　them　something　finite　upon　which　it　might　fasten。　All
the　forms　of　finite　thought　will　make　their　appearance　in　the　course　of　logical　development；　the
order　in　which　they　present　themselves　being　determined　by　necessary　laws。　Here　in　the
introduction　they　could　only　be　unscientifically　assumed　as　something　given。　In　the　theory　of　logic
itself　these　forms　will　be　exhibited；　not　only　on　their　negative；　but　also　on　their　positive　side。

When　we　compare　the　different　forms　of　ascertaining　truth　with　one　another；　the　first　of　them；
immediate　knowledge；　may　perhaps　seem　the　finest；　noblest；　and　most　appropriate。　It　includes
everything　which　the　moralists　term　innocence　as　well　as　religious　feeling；　simple　trust；　love；
fidelity；　and　natural　faith。　The　two　other　forms；　first　reflective；　and　secondly　philosophical
cognition；　must　leave　that　unsought　natural　harmony　behind。　And　so　far　as　they　have　this　in
common；　the　methods　which　claim　to　apprehend　the　truth　by　thought　may　naturally　be　regarded　as
part　and　parcel　of　the　pride　which　leads　man　to　trust　to　his　own　powers　for　a　knowledge　of　the
truth。　Such　a　position　involves　a　thorough…going　disruption；　and；　viewed　in　that　light；　might　be
regarded　as　the　source　of　all　evil　and　wickedness　…　the　original　transgression。　Apparently　t