shorter logic-第27部分

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contrary　that　they　belonged　to　our　own　thought　itself；　to　the　spontaneity　of
thought。　To　that　extent　therefore　they　were　subjective。　And　yet　in　spite　of　this；
Kant　gives　the　name　objective　to　what　is　thought；　to　the　universal　and　necessary；
while　he　describes　as　subjective　whatever　is　merely　felt。　This　arrangement
apparently　reverses　the　first…mentioned　use　of　the　word；　and　has　caused　Kant　to
be　charged　with　confusing　language。　But　the　charge　is　unfair　if　we　more　narrowly
consider　the　facts　of　the　case。　The　vulgar　believe　that　the　objects　of　perception
which　confront　them；　such　as　an　individual　animal；　or　a　single　star；　are
independent　and　permanent　existences；　compared　with　which　thoughts　are
unsubstantial　and　dependent　on　something　else。　In　fact　however　the　perceptions
of　sense　are　the　properly　dependent　and　secondary　feature；　while　the　thoughts　are
really　independent　and　primary。　This　being　so；　Kant　gave　the　title　objective　to　the
intellectual　factor；　to　the　universal　and　necessary：　and　he　was　quite　justified　in　so
doing。　Our　sensations　on　the　other　hand　are　subjective；　for　sensations　lack
stability　in　their　own　nature；　and　are　no　less　fleeting　and　evanescent　than　thought
is　permanent　and　self…subsisting。　At　the　present　day；　the　special　line　of　distinction
established　by　Kant　between　the　subjective　and　objective　is　adopted　by　the
phraseology　of　the　educated　world。　Thus　the　criticism　of　a　work　of　art　ought；　it　is
said；　to　be　not　subjective；　but　objective　…　in　other　words；　instead　of　springing
from　the　particular　and　accidental　feeling　or　temper　of　the　moment；　it　should　keep
its　eye　on　those　general　points　of　view　which　the　laws　of　art　establish。　In　the
same　acceptation　we　can　distinguish　in　any　scientific　pursuit　the　objective　and　the
subjective　interest　of　the　investigation。　

But　after　all；　objectivity　of　thought；　in　Kant's　sense；　is　again　to　a　certain　extent
subjective。　Thoughts；　according　to　Kant；　although　universal　and　necessary
categories；　are　only　our　thoughts　…　separated　by　an　impassable　gulf　from　the
thing；　as　it　exists　apart　from　our　knowledge。　But　the　true　objectivity　of　thinking
means　that　the　thoughts；　far　from　being　merely　ours；　must　at　the　same　time　be
the　real　essence　of　the　things；　and　of　whatever　is　an　object　to　us。　

Objective　and　subjective　are　convenient　expressions　in　current　use；　the
employment　of　which　may　easily　lead　to　confusion。　Up　to　this　point；　the
discussion　has　shown　three　meanings　of　objectivity。　First；　it　means　what　has
external　existence；　in　distinction　from　which　the　subjective　is　what　is　only
supposed；　dreamed；　&c。　Secondly；　it　has　the　meaning；　attached　to　it　by　Kant；　of
the　universal　and　necessary；　as　distinguished　from　the　particular；　subjective；　and
occasional　element　which　belongs　to　our　sensations。　Thirdly；　as　has　been　just
explained；　it　means　the　thought…apprehended　essence　of　the　existing　thing；　in
contradistinction　from　what　is　merely　our　thought；　and　what　consequently　is　still
separated　from　the　thing　itself；　as　it　exists　in　independent　essence。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　42

（a）　The　Theoretical　Faculty。　Cognition　qua　cognition。　The　specific　ground　of　the
categories　is　declared　by　the　Critical　system　to　lie　in　the　primary　identity　of　the　'I'
in　thought　what　Kant　calls　the　'transcendental　unity　of　self…consciousness'。　The
impressions　from　feeling　and　perception　are；　if　we　look　to　their　contents；　a
multiplicity　or　miscellany　of　elements：　and　the　multiplicity　is　equally　conspicuous
in　their　form。　For　sense　is　marked　by　a　mutual　exclusion　of　members；　and　that
under　two　aspects；　namely　space　and　time；　which；　being　the　forms；　that　is　to　say；
the　universal　type　of　perception；　are　themselves　a　priori。　This　congeries；
afforded　by　sensation　and　perception；　must　however　be　reduced　to　an　identity　or
primary　synthesis。　To　accomplish　this　the　'I'　brings　it　in　relation　to　itself　and
unites　it　there　in　one　consciousness　which　Kant　calls　'pure　apperception'。　The
specific　modes　in　which　the　Ego　refers　to　itself　the　multiplicity　of　sense　are　the
pure　concepts　of　the　understanding；　the　Categories。　

Kant；　it　is　well　known；　did　not　put　himself　to　much　trouble　in　discovering　the
categories。　'I'；　the　unity　of　selfconsciousness；　being　quite　abstract　and　completely
indeterminate；　the　question　arises；　how　are　we　to　get　at　the　specialised　forms　of
the　'I'；　the　categories？　Fortunately；　the　common　logic　offers　to　our　hand　an
empirical　classification　of　the　kinds　of　judgement。　Now；　to　judge　is　the　same　as
to　think　of　a　determinate　object。　Hence　the　various　modes　of　judgement；　as
enumerated　to　our　hand；　provide　us　with　the　several　categories　of　thought。　To　the
philosophy　of　Fichte　belongs　the　great　merit　of　having　called　attention　to　the　need
of　exhibiting　the　necessity　of　these　categories　and　giving　a　genuine　deduction　of
them。　Fichte　ought　to　have　produced　at　least　one　effect　on　the　method　of　logic。
One　might　have　expected　that　the　general　laws　of　thought；　the　usual
stock…in…trade　of　logicians；　or　the　classification　of　notions；　judgements；　and
syllogisms；　would　be　no　longer　taken　merely　from　observation　and　so　only
empirically　treated；　but　be　deduced　from　thought　itself。　If　thought　is　to　be　capable
of　proving　anything　at　all；　if　logic　must　insist　upon　the　necessity　of　proofs；　and　if
it　proposes　to　teach　the　theory　of　demonstration；　its　first　care　should　be　to　give　a
reason　for　its　own　subject。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§42n

（1）　Kant　therefore　holds　that　the　categories　have　their　source　in　the　'Ego'　and　that　the　'Ego'
consequently　supplies　the　characteristics　of　universality　and　necessity。　If　we　observe　what　we　have
before　us　primarily；　we　may　describe　it　as　a　congeries　or　diversity：　and　in　the　categories　we　find
the　simple　points　or　units；　to　which　this　congeries　is　made　to　converge。　The　world　of　sense　is　a
scene　of　mutual　exclusion：　its　being　is　outside　itself。　That　is　the　fundamental　feature　of　the　sensible。
'Now'　has　no　meaning　except　in　reference　to　a　before　and　a　hereafter。　Red；　in　the　same　way；　only
subsists　by　being　opposed　to　yellow　and　blue。　Now　this　other　thing　is　outside　the　sensible；　which
latter　is；　only　in　so　far　as　it　is　not　the　other；　and　only　in　so　far　as　that　other　is。　But　thought；　or　the
'Ego'；　occupies　a　position　the　very　reverse　of　the　sensible；　with　its　mutual　exclusions；　and　its　being
outside　itself。　The　'I'　is　the　primary　identity　…　at　one　with　itself　and　all　at　home　in　itself。　The　word　'　I'
expresses　the　mere　act　of　bringing…to…bear…upon…self：　and　whatever　is　placed　in　this　unit　or　focus
is　affected　by　it　and　transformed　into　it。　The　'I'　is　as　it　were　the　crucible　and　the　fire　which
consumes　the　loose　plurality　of　sense　and　reduces　it　to　unity。　This　is　the　process　which　Kant　calls
pure　apperception　in　distinction　from　the　common　apperception；　to　which　the　plurality　it　receives　is
a　plurality　still；　whereas　pure　apperception　is　rather　an　act　by　which　the　'I'　makes　the　materials
'mine'。　

This　view　has　at　least　the　merit　of　giving　a　correct　expression　to　the　nature　of　all　consciousness。
The　tendency　of　all　man's　endeavours　is　to　understand　the　world；　to　appropriate　a