shorter logic-第29部分

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when　thought　is　carried　on　to　abstraction　unalloyed：　that　it　is　the　work　of　the
empty　'Ego'；　which　makes　an　object　out　of　this　empty　self…identity　of　its　own。
The　negative　characteristic　which　this　abstract　identity　receives　as　an　object　is
also　enumerated　among　the　categories　of　Kant；　and　is　no　less　familiar　than　the
empty　identity　aforesaid。　Hence　one　can　only　read　with　surprise　the　perpetual
remark　that　we　do　not　know　the　Thing…in…itself。　On　the　contrary　there　is　nothing
we　can　know　so　easily。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　45

It　is　Reason；　the　faculty　of　the　Unconditioned；　which　discovers　the　conditioned
nature　of　the　knowledge　comprised　in　experience。　What　is　thus　called　the　object
of　Reason；　the　Infinite　or　Unconditioned；　is　nothing　but　self…sameness；　or　the
primary　identity　of　the　'Ego'　in　thought　（mentioned　in　§　42）。　Reason　itself　is　the
name　given　to　the　abstract　'Ego'　or　thought；　which　makes　this　pure　identity　its　aim
or　object　（cf。　note　to　the　preceding　§）。　Now　this　identity；　having　no　definite
attribute　at　all；　can　receive　no　illumination　from　the　truths　of　experience；　for　the
reason　that　these　refer　always　to　definite　facts。　Such　is　the　sort　of　Unconditioned
that　is　supposed　to　be　the　absolute　truth　of　Reason　what　is　termed　the　Idea；　while
the　cognitions　of　experience　are　reduced　to　the　level　of　untruth　and　declared　to　be
appearances。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§45n

Kant　was　the　first　definitely　to　signalise　the　distinction　between　Reason　and　Understanding。　The
object　of　the　former；　as　he　applied　the　term；　was　the　infinite　and　unconditioned；　of　the　latter　the
finite　and　conditioned。　Kant　did　valuable　service　when　he　enforced　the　finite　character　of　the
cognitions　of　the　understanding　founded　merely　upon　experience；　and　stamped　their　contents　with
the　name　of　appearance。　But　his　mistake　was　to　stop　at　the　purely　negative　point　of　view；　and　to
limit　the　unconditionality　of　Reason　to　an　abstract　self…sameness　without　any　shade　of　distinction。　It
degrades　Reason　to　a　finite　and　conditioned　thing；　to　identify　it　with　a　mere　stepping　beyond　the
finite　and　conditioned　range　of　understanding。　The　real　infinite；　far　from　being　a　mere
transcendence　of　the　finite；　always　involves　the　absorption　of　the　finite　into　its　own　fuller　nature。　In
the　same　way　Kant　restored　the　Idea　to　its　proper　dignity：　vindicating　it　for　Reason；　as　a　thing
distinct　from　abstract　analytic　determinations　or　from　the　merely　sensible　conceptions　which
usually　appropriate　to　themselves　the　name　of　ideas。　But　as　respects　the　Idea　also；　he　never　got
beyond　its　negative　aspect；　as　what　ought　to　be　but　is　not。　

The　view　that　the　objects　of　immediate　consciousness；　which　constitute　the　body　of　experience；
are　mere　appearances　（phenomena）　was　another　important　result　of　the　Kantian　philosophy。
Common　Sense；　that　mixture　of　sense　and　understanding；　believes　the　objects　of　which　it　has
knowledge　to　be　severally　independent　and　self…supporting；　and　when　it　becomes　evident　that　they
tend　towards　and　limit　one　another；　the　interdependence　of　one　upon　another　is　reckoned
something　foreign　to　them　and　to　their　true　nature。　The　very　opposite　is　the　truth。　The　things
immediately　known　are　mere　appearances　…　in　other　words；　the　ground　of　their　being　is　not　in
themselves　but　in　something　else。　But　then　comes　the　important　step　of　defining　what　this
something　else　is。　According　to　Kant；　the　things　that　we　know　about　are　to　us　appearances　only；
and　we　can　never　know　their　essential　nature；　which　belongs　to　another　world　we　cannot
approach。　

Plain　minds　have　not　unreasonably　taken　exception　to　this　subjective　idealism；　with　its　reduction　of
the　facts　of　consciousness　to　a　purely　personal　world；　created　by　ourselves　alone。　For　the　true
statement　of　the　case　is　rather　as　follows。　The　things　of　which　we　have　direct　consciousness　are
mere　phenomena；　not　for　us　only；　but　in　their　own　nature；　and　the　true　and　proper　case　of　these
things；　finite　as　they　are；　is　to　have　their　existence　founded　not　in　themselves　but　in　the　universal
divine　Idea。　This　view　of　things；　it　is　true；　is　as　idealist　as　Kant's；　but　in　contradistinction　to　the
subjective　idealism　of　the　Critical　philosophy　should　be　termed　absolute　idealism。　Absolute
idealism；　however；　though　it　is　far　in　advance　of　vulgar　realism；　is　by　no　means　merely　restricted　to
philosophy。　It　lies　at　the　root　of　all　religion；　for　religion　too　believes　the　actual　world　we　see；　the
sum　total　of　existence；　to　be　created　and　governed　by　God。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　46

But　it　is　not　enough　simply　to　indicate　the　existence　of　the　object　of　Reason。
Curiosity　impels　us　to　seek　for　knowledge　of　this　identity；　this　empty
thing…in…itself。　Now　knowledge　means　such　an　acquaintance　with　the　object　as
apprehends　its　distinct　and　special　subject…matter。　But　such　subject…matter
involves　a　complex　interconnection　in　the　object　itself；　and　supplies　a　ground　of
connection　with　many　other　objects。　In　the　present　case；　to　express　the　nature　of
the　features　of　the　Infinite　or　Thing…in…itself；　Reason　would　have　nothing　except
the　categories：　and　in　any　endeavour　so　to　employ　them　Reason　becomes
over…soaring　or　'transcendent'。　

Here　begins　the　second　stage　of　the　Criticism　of　Reason　which；　as　an　independent
piece　of　work；　is　more　valuable　than　the　first。　The　first　part；　as　has　been
explained　above；　teaches　that　the　categories　originate　in　the　unity　of
self…consciousness；　that　any　knowledge　which　is　gained　by　their　means　has
nothing　objective　in　it；　and　that　the　very　objectivity　claimed　for　them　is　only
subjective。　So　far　as　this　goes；　the　Kantian　Criticism　presents　that　'common'　type
of　idealism　known　as　Subjective　Idealism。　It　asks　no　questions　about　the　meaning
or　scope　of　the　categories；　but　simply　considers　the　abstract　form　of　subjectivity
and　objectivity；　and　that　even　in　such　a　partial　way　that　the　former　aspect；　that　of
subjectivity；　is　retained　as　a　final　and　purely　affirmative　term　of　thought。　In　the
second　part；　however；　when　Kant　examines　the　application；　as　it　is　called；　which
Reason　makes　of　the　categories　in　order　to　know　its　objects；　the　content　of　the
categories；　at　least　in　some　points　of　view；　comes　in　for　discussion：　or；　at　any
rate；　an　opportunity　presented　itself　for　a　discussion　of　the　question。　It　is　worth
while　to　see　what　decision　Kant　arrives　at　on　the　subject　of　metaphysic；　as　this
application　of　the　categories　to　the　unconditioned　is　called。　His　method　of
procedure　we　shall　here　briefly　state　and　criticise。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§47

＇a＇　The　first　of　the　unconditioned　entities　which　Kant　examines　is　the　Soul　（see
above；　§　34）。　'In　my　consciousness'；　he　says；　'I　always　find　that　I　（1）　am　the
determining　subject；　（2）　am　singular　or　abstractly　simple；　（3）　am　identical；　or　one
and　the　same；　in　all　the　variety　of　what　I　am　conscious　of；　（4）　distinguish　myself
as　thinking　from　all　the　things　outside　me。'　

Now　the　method　of　the　old　metaphysic；　as　Kant　correctly　states　it；　consisted　in
substituting　for　these　statements　of　experience　the　corresponding　categories　or
meta