shorter logic-第35部分

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anything；　or　from　originating　any　special　forms；　whether　cognitive　principles　or
moral　laws；　but　nevertheless　it　absolutely　refused　to　accept　or　indulge　anything
possessing　the　character　of　an　externality。　Henceforth　the　principle　of　the
independence　of　Reason；　or　of　its　absolute　self…subsistence；　is　made　a　general
principle　of　philosophy；　as　well　as　a　foregone　conclusion　of　the　time。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§60n

（1）　The　Critical　philosophy　has　one　great　negative　merit。　It　has　brought　home　the　conviction　that
the　categories　of　understanding　are　finite　in　their　range；　and　that　any　cognitive　process　confined
within　their　pale　falls　short　of　the　truth。　But　Kant　had　only　a　sight　of　half　the　truth。　He　explained　the
finite　nature　of　the　categories　to　mean　that　they　were　subjective　only；　valid　only　for　our　thought；
from　which　the　thing…in…itself　was　divided　by　an　impassable　gulf。　In　fact；　however；　it　is　not　because
they　are　subjective　that　the　categories　are　finite：　they　are　finite　by　their　very　nature；　and　it　is　on　their
own　selves　that　it　is　requisite　to　exhibit　their　finitude。　Kant　however　holds　that　what　we　think　is
false；　because　it　is　we　who　think　it。　A　further　deficiency　in　the　system　is　that　it　gives　only　a
historical　description　of　thought；　and　a　mere　enumeration　of　the　factors　of　consciousness。　The
enumeration　is　in　the　main　correct：　but　not　a　word　touches　upon　the　necessity　of　what　is　thus
empirically　colligated。　The　observations　made　on　the　various　stages　of　consciousness　culminant　in
the　summary　statement　that　the　content　of　all　we　are　acquainted　with　is　only　an　appearance。　And
as　it　is　true　at　least　that　all　finite　thinking　is　concerned　with　appearances；　so　far　the　conclusion　is
justified。　This　stage　of　'appearance'　however　…　the　phenomenal　world　…　is　not　the　terminus　of
thought：　there　is　another　and　a　higher　region。　But　that　region　was　to　the　Kantian　philosophy　an
inaccessible　'other　world'。　

（2）　After　all　it　was　only　formally　that　the　Kantian　system　established　the　principle　that　thought　is
spontaneous　and　self…determining。　Into　details　of　the　manner　and　the　extent　of　this
self…determination　of　thought；　Kant　never　went。　It　was　Fichte　who　first　noticed　the　omission；　and
who；　after　he　had　called　attention　to　the　want　of　a　deduction　for　the　categories；　endeavoured　really
to　supply　something　of　the　kind。　With　Fichte；　the　'Ego'　is　the　starting…point　in　the　philosophical
development：　and　the　outcome　of　its　action　is　supposed　to　be　visible　in　the　categories。　But　in
Fichte　the　'Ego'　is　not　really　presented　as　a　free；　spontaneous　energy；　it　is　supposed　to　receive　its
first　excitation　by　a　shock　or　impulse　from　without。　Against　this　shock　the　'Ego'　will；　it　is　assumed；
react；　and　only　through　this　reaction　does　it　first　become　conscious　of　itself。　Meanwhile；　the　nature
of　the　impulse　remains　a　stranger　beyond　our　pale：　and　the　'Ego'；　with　something　else　always
confronting　it；　is　weighted　with　a　condition。　Fichte；　in　consequence；　never　advanced　beyond
Kant's　conclusion；　that　the　finite　only　is　knowable；　while　the　infinite　transcends　the　range　of
thought。　What　Kant　calls　the　thing…by…itself；　Fichte　calls　the　impulse　from　without　…　that　abstraction
of　something　else　than　'I'；　not　otherwise　describable　or　definable　than　as　the　negative　or　non…Ego
in　general。　The　'I'　is　thus　looked　at　as　standing　in　essential　relation　with　the　not…I；　through　which　its
act　of　self…determination　is　first　awakened。　And　in　this　manner　the　'I'　is　but　the　continuous　act　of
self…liberation　from　this　impulse；　never　gaining　a　real　freedom；　because　with　the　surcease　of　the
impulse　the　'I'；　whose　being　is　its　action；　would　also　cease　to　be。　Nor　is　the　content　produced　by
the　action　of　the　'　I'　at　all　different　from　the　ordinary　content　of　experience；　except　by　the
supplementary　remark；　that　this　content　is　mere　appearance。　




III。　Third　Attitude　of　Thought　to　Objectivity
　　　　　　　IMMEDIATE　OR　INTUITIVE　KNOWLEDGE


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　61

If　we　are　to　believe　the　Critical　philosophy；　thought　is　subjective；　and　its　ultimate
and　invincible　mode　is　abstract　universality　or　formal　identity。　Thought　is　thus
set　in　opposition　to　Truth；　which　is　no　abstraction；　but　concrete　universality。　In
this　highest　mode　of　thought；　which　is　entitled　Reason；　the　Categories　are　left　out
of　account。　The　extreme　theory　on　the　opposite　side　holds　thought　to　be　an　act　of
the　particular　only；　and　on　that　ground　declares　it　incapable　of　apprehending　the
Truth。　This　is　the　Intuitional　theory。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§62

According　to　this　theory；　thinking；　a　private　and　particular　operation；　has　its　whole
scope　and　product　in　the　Categories。　But　these　Categories；　as　arrested　by　the
understanding；　are　limited　vehicles　of　thought；　forms　of　the　conditioned；　of　the
dependent　and　derivative。　A　thought　limited　to　these　modes　has　no　sense　of　the
Infinite　and　the　True；　and　cannot　bridge　over　the　gulf　that　separates　it　from　them。
（This　stricture　refers　to　the　proofs　of　God's　existence。）　These　inadequate　modes
or　categories　are　also　spoken　of　as　notions：　and　to　get　a　notion　of　an　object
therefore　can　only　mean；　in　this　language；　to　grasp　it　under　the　form　of　being
conditioned　and　derivative。　Consequently；　if　the　object　in　question　be　the　True；
the　Infinite；　the　Unconditioned；　we　change　it　by　our　notions　into　a　finite　and
conditioned；　whereby；　instead　of　apprehending　the　truth　by　thought；　we　have
perverted　it　into　untruth。　

Such　is　the　one　simple　line　of　argument　advanced　for　the　thesis　that　the
knowledge　of　God　and　of　truth　must　be　immediate；　or　intuitive。　At　an　earlier
period　all　sort　of　anthropomorphic　conceptions；　as　they　are　termed；　were
banished　from　God；　as　being　finite　and　therefore　unworthy　of　the　infinite；　and　in
this　way　God　had　been　reduced　to　a　tolerably　blank　being。　But　in　those　days　the
thought…forms　were　in　general　not　supposed　to　come　under　the　head　of
anthropomorphism。　Thought　was　believed　rather　to　strip　finitude　from　the
conceptions　of　the　Absolute…in　agreement　with　the　above…mentioned　conviction　of
all　ages；　that　reflection　is　the　only　road　to　truth。　But　now；　at　length；　even　the
thought…forms　are　pronounced　anthropomorphic；　and　thought　itself　is　described　as
a　mere　faculty　of　Unitisation。　

Jacobi　has　stated　this　charge　most　distinctly　in　the　seventh　supplement　to　his
Letters　on　Spinoza　…　borrowing　his　line　of　argument　from　the　works　of　Spinoza
himself；　and　applying　it　as　a　weapon　against　knowledge　in　general。　In　his　attack
knowledge　is　taken　to　mean　knowledge　of　the　finite　only；　a　process　of　thought
from　one　condition　in　a　series　to　another；　each　of　which　is　at　once　conditioning
and　conditioned。　According　to　such　a　view；　to　explain　and　to　get　the　notion　of
anything；　is　the　same　as　to　show　it　to　be　derived　from　something　else。　Whatever
such　knowledge　embraces；　consequently；　is　partial；　dependent；　and　finite；　while
the　infinite　or　true；　i。e。　God；　lies　outside　of　the　mechanical　interconnection　to
which　knowledge　is　said　to　be　confined。　It　is　important　to　observe　that；　while
Kant　makes　the　finite　nature　of　the　Categories　consist　mainl