shorter logic-第76部分

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Necessity　is　often　called　hard；　and　rightly　so；　if　we　keep　to　necessity　as　such；　i。e。　to　its　immediate
shape。　Here　we　have；　first　of　all；　some　state　or；　generally　speaking；　fact；　possessing　an
independent　subsistence：　and　necessity　primarily　implies　that　there　falls　upon　such　a　fact　something
else　by　which　it　is　brought　low。　This　is　what　is　hard　and　sad　in　necessity　immediate　or　abstract。
The　identity　of　the　two　things；　which　necessity　presents　as　bound　to　each　other　and　thus　bereft　of
their　independence；　is　at　first　only　inward；　and　therefore　has　no　existence　for　those　under　the　yoke
of　necessity。　Freedom　too　from　this　point　of　view　is　only　abstract；　and　is　preserved　only　by
renouncing　all　that　we　immediately　are　and　have。　But；　as　we　have　already　seen；　the　process　of
necessity　is　so　directed　that　it　overcomes　the　rigid　externality　which　it　first　had　and　reveals　its
inward　nature。　It　then　appears　that　the　members；　linked　to　one　another；　are　not　really　foreign　to
each　other；　but　only　elements　of　one　whole；　each　of　them；　in　its　connection　with　the　other；　being；
as　it　were；　at　home；　and　combining　with　itself。　In　this　way；　necessity　is　transfigured　into　freedom　…
not　the　freedom　that　consists　in　abstract　negation；　but　freedom　concrete　and　positive。　From　which
we　may　learn　what　a　mistake　it　is　to　regard　freedom　and　necessity　as　mutually　exclusive。　Necessity
indeed；　qua　necessity；　is　far　from　being　freedom：　yet　freedom　presupposes　necessity；　and　contains
it　as　an　unsubstantial　element　in　itself。　

A　good　man　is　aware　that　the　tenor　of　his　conduct　is　essentially　obligatory　and　necessary。　But　this
consciousness　is　so　far　from　making　any　abatement　from　his　freedom；　that　without　it；　real　and
reasonable　freedom　could　not　be　distinguished　from　arbitrary　choice　…　a　freedom　which　has　no
reality　and　is　merely　potential。　A　criminal；　when　punished；　may　look　upon　his　punishment　as　a
restriction　of　his　freedom。　Really　the　punishment　is　not　foreign　constraint　to　which　he　is　subjected；
but　the　manifestation　of　his　own　act。　In　short；　man　is　most　independent　when　he　knows　himself　to
be　determined　by　the　absolute　idea　throughout。　It　was　this　phase　of　mind　and　conduct　which
Spinoza　called　Amor　intellectualis　Dei。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§159
Thus　the　Notion　is　the　truth　of　Being　and　Essence；　inasmuch　as　the　shining　or
show　of　self…reflection　is　itself　at　the　same　time　independent　immediacy；　and　this
being　of　a　different　actuality　is　immediately　only　a　shining　or　show　on　itself。　

The　Notion　has　exhibited　itself　as　the　truth　of　Being　and　Essence　as　the　ground　to
which　the　regress　of　both　leads。　Conversely　it　has　been　developed　out　of　being　as
its　ground。　The　former　aspect　of　the　advance　may　be　regarded　as　a　concentration
of　being　into　its　depth；　thereby　disclosing　its　inner　nature：　the　latter　aspect　as　an
issuing　of　the　more　perfect　from　the　less　perfect。　When　such　development　is
viewed　on　the　latter　side　only；　it　does　prejudice　to　the　method　of　philosophy。　The
special　meaning　which　these　superficial　thoughts　of　more　imperfect　and　more
perfect　have　in　this　place　is　to　indicate　the　distinction　of　being；　as　an　immediate
unity　with　itself；　from　the　notion；　as　free　mediation　with　itself。　Since　being　has
shown　that　it　is　an　element　in　the　notion；　the　latter　has　thus　exhibited　itself　as　the
truth　of　being。　As　this　its　reflection　in　itself　and　as　an　absorption　of　the　mediation；
the　notion　is　the　pre…supposition　of　the　immediate　—　a　presupposition　which　is
identical　with　the　return　to　self；　and　in　this　identity　lie　freedom　and　the　notion。　If
the　partial　element　therefore　be　called　the　imperfect；　then　the　notion；　or　the
perfect；　is　certainly　a　development　from　the　imperfect；　since　its　very　nature　is
thus　to　suspend　its　pre…supposition。　At　the　same　time　it　is　the　notion　alone　which；
in　the　act　of　supposing　itself；　makes　its　presupposition；　as　has　been　made
apparent　in　causality　in　general　and　especially　in　reciprocal　action。　

Thus　in　reference　to　Being　and　Essence　the　Notion　is　defined　as　Essence　reverted
to　the　simple　immediacy　of　Being　—　the　shining　or　show　of　Essence　thereby
having　actuality；　and　its　actuality　being　at　the　same　time　a　free　shining　or　show　in
itself。　In　this　manner　the　notion　has　being　as　its　simple　self…relation；　or　as　the
immediacy　of　its　immanent　unity。　Being　is　so　poor　a　category　that　It　is　the　least
thing　which　can　be　shown　to　be　found　in　the　notion。　The　passage　from　necessity
to　freedom；　or　from　actuality　into　the　notion；　is　the　very　hardest；　because　it
proposes　that　independent　actuality　shall　be　thought　as　having　all　its　substantiality
in　the　passing　over　and　identity　with　the　other　independent　actuality。　The　notion；
too；　is　extremely　hard；　because　it　is　itself　just　this　very　identity。　But　the　actual
substance　as　such；　the　cause；　which　in　its　exclusiveness　resists　all　invasion；　is　ipso
facto　subjected　to　necessity　or　the　destiny　of　passing　into　dependency：　and　it　is
this　subjection　rather　where　the　chief　hardness　lies。　To　think　necessity；　on　the
contrary；　rather　tends　to　melt　that　hardness。　For　thinking　means　that；　in　the　other；
one　meets　with　one's　self。　It　means　a　liberation；　which　is　not　the　flight　of
abstraction；　but　consists　in　that　which　is　actual　having　itself　not　as　something　else；
but　as　its　own　being　and　creation；　in　the　other　actuality　with　which　it　is　bound　up
by　the　force　of　necessity。　As　existing　in　an　individual　form；　this　liberation　is　called
I：　as　developed　to　its　totality；　it　is　free　Spirit；　as　feeling；　it　is　Love；　and　as
enjoyment；　it　is　Blessedness。　The　great　vision　of　substance　in　Spinoza　is　only　a
potential　liberation　from　finite　exclusiveness　and　egotism：　but　the　notion　itself
realises　for　its　own　both　the　power　of　necessity　and　actual　freedom。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　159n
When；　as　now；　the　notion　is　called　the　truth　of　Being　and　Essence；　we　must　expect　to　be　asked；
why　do　we　not　begin　with　the　notion？　The　answer　is　that；　where　knowledge　by　thought　is　our　aim；
we　cannot　begin　with　the　truth；　because　the　truth；　when　it　forms　the　beginning；　must　rest　on　mere
assertion。　The　truth　when　it　is　thought　must　as　such　verify　itself　to　thought。　If　the　notion　were　put　at
the　head　of　Logic；　and　defined；　quite　correctly　in　point　of　content；　as　the　unity　of　Being　and
Essence；　the　following　question　would　come　up：　What　are　we　to　think　under　the　terms　'Being'　and
'Essence'；　and　how　do　they　come　to　be　embraced　in　the　unity　of　the　Notion？　But　if　we　answered
these　questions；　then　our　beginning　with　the　notion　would　merely　be　nominal。　The　real　start　would
be　made　with　Being；　as　we　have　here　done：　with　this　difference；　that　the　characteristics　of　Being　as
well　as　those　of　Essence　would　have　to　be　accepted　uncritically　from　figurate　conception；　whereas
we　have　observed　Being　and　Essence　in　their　own　dialectical　development　and　learnt　how　they
lose　themselves　in　the　unity　of　the　notion。　




Third　Subdivision　of　The　Logic；
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　IX。　NOTION
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　160

The　Notion　is　the　principle　of　freedom；　the　power　of　substance　self…realised。　It　is
a　systematic　whole；　in　whi