representative government-第51部分

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　Prevention　Act；　some　of　them　of　great　practical　experience　in　election　matters；　were　favourable　（either　absolutely　or　as　a　last　resort）　to　the　principle　of　requiring　a　declaration　from　members　of　Parliament；　and　were　of　opinion　that；　if　supported　by　penalties；　it　would　be；　to　a　great　degree；　effectual。　（Evidence；　pp。　46；　54…57；　67；　123；　198…202；　208。）　The　Chief　Commissioner　of　the　Wakefield　Inquiry　said　（in　reference　certainly　to　a　different　proposal）；　〃If　they　see　that　the　Legislature　is　earnest　upon　the　subject；　the　machinery　will　work。。。。　I　am　quite　sure　that　if　some　personal　stigma　were　applied　upon　conviction　of　bribery；　it　would　change　the　current　of　public　opinion〃　（pp。　26　and　32）。　A　distinguished　member　of　the　Committee　（and　of　the　present　Cabinet）　seemed　to　think　it　very　objectionable　to　attach　the　penalties　of　perjury　to　a　merely　promissory　as　distinguished　from　an　assertory　oath；　but　he　was　reminded；　that　the　oath　taken　by　a　witness　in　a　court　of　justice　is　a　promissory　oath：　and　the　rejoinder　（that　the　witness's　promise　relates　to　an　act　to　be　done　at　once；　while　the　member's　would　be　a　promise　for　all　future　time）　would　only　be　to　the　purpose；　if　it　could　be　supposed　that　the　swearer　might　forget　the　obligation　he　had　entered　into；　or　could　possibly　violate　it　unawares：　contingencies　which；　in　a　case　like　the　present；　are　out　of　the　question。　　　A　more　substantial　difficulty　is　that　one　of　the　forms　most　frequently　assumed　by　election　expenditure　is　that　of　subscriptions　to　local　charities；　or　other　local　objects；　and　it　would　be　a　strong　measure　to　enact　that　money　should　not　be　given　in　charity；　within　a　place；　by　the　member　for　it。　When　such　subscriptions　are　bona　fide；　the　popularity　which　may　be　derived　from　them　is　an　advantage　which　it　seems　hardly　possible　to　deny　to　superior　riches。　But　the　greatest　part　of　the　mischief　consists　in　the　fact　that　money　so　contributed　is　employed　in　bribery；　under　the　euphemistic　name　of　keeping　up　the　member's　interest。　To　guard　against　this；　it　should　be　part　of　the　member's　promissory　declaration；　that　all　sums　expended　by　him　in　the　place；　or　for　any　purpose　connected　with　it　or　with　any　of　its　inhabitants　（with　the　exception　perhaps　of　his　own　hotel　expenses）；　should　pass　through　the　hands　of　the　election　auditor；　and　be　by　him　（and　not　by　the　member　himself　or　his　friends）　applied　to　its　declared　purpose。　　　The　principle　of　making　all　lawful　expenses　of　a　charge　not　upon　the　candidate；　but　upon　the　locality；　was　upheld　by　two　of　the　best　witnesses　（pp。　20；　65…70；　277）。

　　There　is　scarcely　any　mode　in　which　political　institutions　are　more　morally　mischievous…work　greater　evil　through　their　spirit…than　by　representing　political　functions　as　a　favour　to　be　conferred；　a　thing　which　the　depositary　is　to　ask　for　as　desiring　it　for　himself；　and　even　pay　for　as　if　it　were　designed　for　his　pecuniary　benefit。　Men　are　not　fond　of　paying　large　sums　for　leave　to　perform　a　laborious　duty。　Plato　had　a　much　juster　view　of　the　conditions　of　good　government　when　he　asserted　that　the　persons　who　should　be　sought　out　to　be　invested　with　political　power　are　those　who　are　personally　most　averse　to　it；　and　that　the　only　motive　which　can　be　relied　on　for　inducing　the　fittest　men　to　take　upon　themselves　the　toils　of　government　is　the　fear　of　being　governed　by　worse　men。　What　must　an　elector　think；　when　he　sees　three　or　four　gentlemen；　none　of　them　previously　observed　to　be　lavish　of　their　money　on　projects　of　disinterested　beneficence；　vying　with　one　another　in　the　sums　they　expend　to　be　enabled　to　write　M。P。　after　their　names？　Is　it　likely　he　will　suppose　that　it　is　for　his　interest　they　incur　all　this　cost？　And　if　he　form　an　uncomplimentary　opinion　of　their　part　in　the　affair；　what　moral　obligation　is　he　likely　to　feel　as　to　his　own？　Politicians　are　fond　of　treating　it　as　the　dream　of　enthusiasts　that　the　electoral　body　will　ever　be　uncorrupt：　truly　enough；　until　they　are　willing　to　become　so　themselves：　for　the　electors；　assuredly；　will　take　their　moral　tone　from　the　candidates。　So　long　as　the　elected　member；　in　any　shape　or　manner；　pay　for　his　seat；　all　endeavours；　will　fail　to　make　the　business　of　election　anything　but　a　selfish　bargain　on　all　sides。　〃So　long　as　the　candidate　himself；　and　the　customs　of　the　world；　seem　to　regard　the　function　of　a　member　of　Parliament　less　as　a　duty　to　be　discharged　than　a　personal　favour　to　be　solicited；　no　effort　will　avail　to　implant　in　an　ordinary　voter　the　feeling　that　the　election　of　a　member　of　Parliament　is　also　a　matter　of　duty；　and　that　he　is　not　at　liberty　to　bestow　his　vote　on　any　other　consideration　than　that　of　personal　fitness。〃　　　The　same　principle　which　demands　that　no　payment　of　money　for　election　purposes　should　be　either　required　or　tolerated　on　the　part　of　the　person　elected　dictates　another　conclusion；　apparently　of　contrary　tendency；　but　really　directed　to　the　same　object。　It　negatives　what　has　often　been　proposed　as　a　means　of　rendering　Parliament　accessible　to　persons　of　all　ranks　and　circumstances；　the　payment　of　members　of　Parliament。　If；　as　in　some　of　our　colonies；　there　are　scarcely　any　fit　persons　who　can　afford　to　attend　to　an　unpaid　occupation；　the　payment　should　be　an　indemnity　for　loss　of　time　or　money；　not　a　salary。　The　greater　latitude　of　choice　which　a　salary　would　give　is　an　illusory　advantage。　No　remuneration　which　any　one　would　think　of　attaching　to　the　post　would　attract　to　it　those　who　were　seriously　engaged　in　other　lucrative　professions　with　a　prospect　of　succeeding　in　them。　The　business　of　a　member　of　Parliament　would　therefore　become　an　occupation　in　itself；　carried　on；　like　other　professions；　with　a　view　chiefly　to　its　pecuniary　returns；　and　under　the　demoralising　influences　of　an　occupation　essentially　precarious。　It　would　become　an　object　of　desire　to　adventurers　of　a　low　class；　and　658　persons　in　possession；　with　ten　or　twenty　times　as　many　in　expectancy；　would　be　incessantly　bidding　to　attract　or　retain　the　suffrages　of　the　electors；　by　promising　all　things；　honest　or　dishonest；　possible　or　impossible；　and　rivalling　each　other　in　pandering　to　the　meanest　feelings　and　most　ignorant　prejudices　of　the　vulgarest　part　of　the　crowd。　The　auction　between　Cleon　and　the　sausage…seller　in　Aristophanes　is　a　fair　caricature　of　what　would　be　always　going　on。　Such　an　institution　would　be　a　perpetual　blister　applied　to　the　most　peccant　parts　of　human　nature。　It　amounts　to　offering　658　prizes　for　the　most　successful　flatterer；　the　most　adroit　misleader；　of　a　body　of　his　fellow…countrymen。　Under　no　despotism　has　there　been　such　an　organised　system　of　tillage　for　raising　a　rich　crop　of　vicious　courtiership。*　When；　by　reason　of　pre…eminent　qualifications　（as　may　at　any　time　happen　to　be　the　case）；　it　is　desirable　that　a　person　entirely　without　independent　means；　either　derived　from　property　or　from　a　trade　or　profession；　should　be　brought　into　Parliament　to　render　services　which　no　other　person　accessible　can　render　as　well；　there　is　the　resource　of　a　public　subscription；　he　may　be　supported　while　in　Parliament；　like　Andrew　Marvell；　by　the　contributions　of　his　constituents。　This　mode　is　unobjectionable　for　such　an　honour　will