representative government-第61部分

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on　needs　be　entertained　of　a　coup　d'etat；　in　making　the　chief　minister　constitutionally　independent　of　the　legislative　body；　and　rendering　the　two　great　branches　of　the　government；　while　equally　popular　both　in　their　origin　and　in　their　responsibility；　an　effective　check　on　one　another。　The　plan　is　in　accordance　with　that　sedulous　avoidance　of　the　concentration　of　great　masses　of　power　in　the　same　hands；　which　is　a　marked　characteristic　of　the　American　Federal　Constitution。　But　the　advantage；　in　this　instance；　is　purchased　at　a　price　above　all　reasonable　estimates　of　its　value。　It　seems　far　better　that　the　chief　magistrate　in　a　republic　should　be　appointed　avowedly；　as　the　chief　minister　in　a　constitutional　monarchy　is　virtually；　by　the　representative　body。　In　the　first　place；　he　is　certain；　when　thus　appointed；　to　be　a　more　eminent　man。　The　party　which　has　the　majority　in　Parliament　would　then；　as　a　rule；　appoint　its　own　leader；　who　is　always　one　of　the　foremost；　and　often　the　very　foremost　person　in　political　life：　while　the　President　of　the　United　States；　since　the　last　survivor　of　the　founders　of　the　republic　disappeared　from　the　scene；　is　almost　always　either　an　obscure　man；　or　one　who　has　gained　any　reputation　he　may　possess　in　some　other　field　than　politics。　And　this；　as　I　have　before　observed；　is　no　accident；　but　the　natural　effect　of　the　situation。　The　eminent　men　of　a　party；　in　an　election　extending　to　the　whole　country；　are　never　its　most　available　candidates。　All　eminent　men　have　made　personal　enemies；　or　have　done　something；　or　at　the　lowest　professed　some　opinion；　obnoxious　to　some　local　or　other　considerable　division　of　the　community；　and　likely　to　tell　with　fatal　effect　upon　the　number　of　votes；　whereas　a　man　without　antecedents；　of　whom　nothing　is　known　but　that　he　professes　the　creed　of　the　party；　is　readily　voted　for　by　its　entire　strength。　Another　important　consideration　is　the　great　mischief　of　unintermitted　electioneering。　When　the　highest　dignity　in　the　State　is　to　be　conferred　by　popular　election　once　in　every　few　years；　the　whole　intervening　time　is　spent　in　what　is　virtually　a　canvass。　President；　ministers；　chiefs　of　parties；　and　their　followers；　are　all　electioneerers：　the　whole　community　is　kept　intent　on　the　mere　personalities　of　politics；　and　every　public　question　is　discussed　and　decided　with　less　reference　to　its　merits　than　to　its　expected　bearing　on　the　presidential　election。　If　a　system　had　been　devised　to　make　party　spirit　the　ruling　principle　of　action　in　all　public　affairs；　and　create　an　inducement　not　only　to　make　every　question　a　party　question；　but　to　raise　questions　for　the　purpose　of　founding　parties　upon　them；　it　would　have　been　difficult　to　contrive　any　means　better　adapted　to　the　purpose。　　　I　will　not　affirm　that　it　would　at　all　times　and　places　be　desirable　that　the　head　of　the　executive　should　be　so　completely　dependent　upon　the　votes　of　a　representative　assembly　as　the　Prime　Minister　is　in　England；　and　is　without　inconvenience。　If　it　were　thought　best　to　avoid　this；　he　might；　though　appointed　by　Parliament；　hold　his　office　for　a　fixed　period；　independent　of　a　parliamentary　vote：　which　would　be　the　American　system；　minus　the　popular　election　and　its　evils。　There　is　another　mode　of　giving　the　head　of　the　administration　as　much　independence　of　the　legislature　as　is　at　all　compatible　with　the　essentials　of　free　government。　He　never　could　be　unduly　dependent　on　a　vote　of　Parliament；　if　he　had；　as　the　British　Prime　Minister　practically　has；　the　power　to　dissolve　the　House　and　appeal　to　the　people：　if　instead　of　being　turned　out　of　office　by　a　hostile　vote；　he　could　only　be　reduced　by　it　to　the　alternative　of　resignation　or　dissolution。　The　power　of　dissolving　Parliament　is　one　which　I　think　it　desirable　he　should　possess；　even　under　the　system　by　which　his　own　tenure　of　office　is　secured　to　him　for　a　fixed　period。　There　ought　not　to　be　any　possibility　of　that　deadlock　in　politics　which　would　ensue　on　a　quarrel　breaking　out　between　a　President　and　an　Assembly；　neither　of　whom；　during　an　interval　which　might　amount　to　years；　would　have　any　legal　means　of　ridding　itself　of　the　other。　To　get　through　such　a　period　without　a　coup　d'etat　being　attempted；　on　either　side　or　on　both；　requires　such　a　combination　of　the　love　of　liberty　and　the　habit　of　self…restraint　as　very　few　nations　have　yet　shown　themselves　capable　of：　and　though　this　extremity　were　avoided；　to　expect　that　the　two　authorities　would　not　paralyse　each　other's　operations　is　to　suppose　that　the　political　life　of　the　country　will　always　be　pervaded　by　a　spirit　of　mutual　forbearance　and　compromise；　imperturbable　by　the　passions　and　excitements　of　the　keenest　party　struggles。　Such　a　spirit　may　exist；　but　even　where　it　does　there　is　imprudence　in　trying　it　too　far。　　　Other　reasons　make　it　desirable　that　some　power　in　the　state　（which　can　only　be　the　executive）　should　have　the　liberty　of　at　any　time；　and　at　discretion；　calling　a　new　Parliament。　When　there　is　a　real　doubt　which　of　two　contending　parties　has　the　strongest　following；　it　is　important　that　there　should　exist　a　constitutional　means　of　immediately　testing　the　point；　and　setting　it　at　rest。　No　other　political　topic　has　a　chance　of　being　properly　attended　to　while　this　is　undecided：　and　such　an　interval　is　mostly　an　interregnum　for　purposes　of　legislative　or　administrative　improvement；　neither　party　having　sufficient　confidence　in　its　strength　to　attempt　things　likely　to　promote　opposition　in　any　quarter　that　has　either　direct　or　indirect　influence　in　the　pending　struggle。　　　I　have　not　taken　account　of　the　case　in　which　the　vast　power　centralised　in　the　chief　magistrate；　and　the　insufficient　attachment　of　the　mass　of　the　people　to　free　institutions；　give　him　a　chance　of　success　in　an　attempt　to　subvert　the　Constitution；　and　usurp　sovereign　power。　Where　such　peril　exists；　no　first　magistrate　is　admissible　whom　the　Parliament　cannot；　by　a　single　vote；　reduce　to　a　private　station。　In　a　state　of　things　holding　out　any　encouragement　to　that　most　audacious　and　profligate　of　all　breaches　of　trust；　even　this　entireness　of　constitutional　dependence　is　but　a　weak　protection。　　　Of　all　officers　of　government；　those　in　whose　appointment　any　participation　of　popular　suffrage　is　the　most　objectionable　are　judicial　officers。　While　there　are　no　functionaries　whose　special　and　professional　qualifications　the　popular　judgment　is　less　fitted　to　estimate；　there　are　none　in　whose　case　absolute　impartiality；　and　freedom　from　connection　with　politicians　or　sections　of　politicians；　are　of　anything　like　equal　importance。　Some　thinkers；　among　others　Mr。　Bentham；　have　been　of　opinion　that；　although　it　is　better　that　judges　should　not　be　appointed　by　popular　election；　the　people　of　their　district　ought　to　have　the　power；　after　sufficient　experience；　of　removing　them　from　their　trust。　It　cannot　be　denied　that　the　irremovability　of　any　public　officer；　to　whom　great　interests　are　entrusted；　is　in　itself　an　evil。　It　is　far　from　desirable　that　there　should　be　no　means　of　getting　rid　of　a　bad　or　incompetent　judge；　unless　for　such　misconduct　as　he　can　be　made　to　answer　for　in　a　criminal　court；　and　that　a　functionar