representative government-第64部分

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o　make　up　for　the　smallness　of　their　knowledge　of　what　is　there　taught　by　greater　knowledge　of　something　else…　allow　marks　to　be　gained　by　proficiency　in　any　other　subject　of　real　utility；　they　are　reproached　for　that　too。　Nothing　will　satisfy　the　objectors　but　free　admission　of　total　ignorance。

　　*　Not　always；　however；　the　most　recondite；　for　a　late　denouncer　of　competitive　examination　in　the　House　of　Commons　had　the　naivete　to　produce　a　set　of　almost　elementary　questions　in　algebra；　history；　and　geography；　as　a　proof　of　the　exorbitant　amount　of　high　scientific　attainment　which　the　Commissioners　were　so　wild　as　to　exact。

　　We　are　triumphantly　told　that　neither　Clive　nor　Wellington　could　have　passed　the　test　which　is　prescribed　for　an　aspirant　to　an　engineer　cadetship。　As　if；　because　Clive　and　Wellington　did　not　do　what　was　not　required　of　them；　they　could　not　have　done　it　if　it　had　been　required。　If　it　be　only　meant　to　inform　us　that　it　is　possible　to　be　a　great　general　without　these　things；　so　it　is　without　many　other　things　which　are　very　useful　to　great　generals。　Alexander　the　Great　had　never　heard　of　Vauban's　rules；　nor　could　Julius　Caesar　speak　French。　We　are　next　informed　that　bookworms；　a　term　which　seems　to　be　held　applicable　to　whoever　has　the　smallest　tincture　of　book…　knowledge；　may　not　be　good　at　bodily　exercises；　or　have　the　habits　of　gentlemen。　This　is　a　very　common　line　of　remark　with　dunces　of　condition；　but　whatever　the　dunces　may　think；　they　have　no　monopoly　of　either　gentlemanly　habits　or　bodily　activity。　Wherever　these　are　needed；　let　them　be　inquired　into　and　separately　provided　for；　not　to　the　exclusion　of　mental　qualifications；　but　in　addition。　Meanwhile；　I　am　credibly　informed；　that　in　the　Military　Academy　at　Woolwich　the　competition　cadets　are　as　superior　to　those　admitted　on　the　old　system　of　nomination　in　these　respects　as　in　all　others；　that　they　learn　even　their　drill　more　quickly；　as　indeed　might　be　expected；　for　an　intelligent　person　learns　all　things　sooner　than　a　stupid　one：　and　that　in　general　demeanour　they　contrast　so　favourably　with　their　predecessors；　that　the　authorities　of　the　institutions　are　impatient　for　the　day　to　arrive　when　the　last　remains　of　the　old　leaven　shall　have　disappeared　from　the　place。　If　this　be　so；　and　it　is　easy　to　ascertain　whether　it　is　so；　it　is　to　be　hoped　we　shall　soon　have　heard　for　the　last　time　that　ignorance　is　a　better　qualification　than　knowledge　for　the　military　and　a　fortiori　for　every　other；　profession；　or　that　any　one　good　quality；　however　little　apparently　connected　with　liberal　education；　is　at　all　likely　to　be　promoted　by　going　without　it。　　　Though　the　first　admission　to　government　employment　be　decided　by　competitive　examination；　it　would　in　most　cases　be　impossible　that　subsequent　promotion　should　be　so　decided：　and　it　seems　proper　that　this　should　take　place；　as　it　usually　does　at　present；　on　a　mixed　system　of　seniority　and　selection。　Those　whose　duties　are　of　a　routine　character　should　rise　by　seniority　to　the　highest　point　to　which　duties　merely　of　that　description　can　carry　them；　while　those　to　whom　functions　of　particular　trust；　and　requiring　special　capacity；　are　confided；　should　be　selected　from　the　body　on　the　discretion　of　the　chief　of　the　office。　And　this　selection　will　generally　be　made　honestly　by　him　if　the　original　appointments　take　place　by　open　competition：　for　under　that　system　his　establishment　will　generally　consist　of　individuals　to　whom；　but　for　the　official　connection；　he　would　have　been　a　stranger。　If　among　them　there　be　any　in　whom　he；　or　his　political　friends　and　supporters；　take　an　interest；　it　will　be　but　occasionally；　and　only　when；　to　this　advantage　of　connection；　is　added；　as　far　as　the　initiatory　examination　could　test　it；　at　least　equality　of　real　merit。　And；　except　when　there　is　a　very　strong　motive　to　job　these　appointments；　there　is　always　a　strong　one　to　appoint　the　fittest　person；　being　the　one　who　gives　to　his　chief　the　most　useful　assistance；　saves　him　most　trouble；　and　helps　most　to　build　up　that　reputation　for　good　management　of　public　business　which　necessarily　and　properly　redounds　to　the　credit　of　the　minister；　however　much　the　qualities　to　which　it　is　immediately　owing　may　be　those　of　his　subordinates。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　15　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　Local　Representative　Bodies。

　　IT　IS　BUT　a　small　portion　of　the　public　business　of　a　country　which　can　be　well　done；　or　safely　attempted；　by　the　central　authorities；　and　even　in　our　own　government；　the　least　centralised　in　Europe；　the　legislative　portion　at　least　of　the　governing　body　busies　itself　far　too　much　with　local　affairs；　employing　the　supreme　power　of　the　State　in　cutting　small　knots　which　there　ought　to　be　other　and　better　means　of　untying。　The　enormous　amount　of　private　business　which　takes　up　the　time　of　Parliament；　and　the　thoughts　of　its　individual　members；　distracting　them　from　the　proper　occupations　of　the　great　council　of　the　nation；　is　felt　by　all　thinkers　and　observers　as　a　serious　evil；　and　what　is　worse；　an　increasing　one。　　　It　would　not　be　appropriate　to　the　limited　design　of　this　treatise　to　discuss　at　large　the　great　question；　in　no　way　peculiar　to　representative　government；　of　the　proper　limits　of　governmental　action。　I　have　said　elsewhere*　what　seemed　to　me　most　essential　respecting　the　principles　by　which　the　extent　of　that　action　ought　to　be　determined。　But　after　subtracting　from　the　functions　performed　by　most　European　governments　those　which　ought　not　to　be　undertaken　by　public　authorities　at　all；　there　still　remains　so　great　and　various　an　aggregate　of　duties　that；　if　only　on　the　principle　of　division　of　labour；　it　is　indispensable　to　share　them　between　central　and　local　authorities。　Not　only　are　separate　executive　officers　required　for　purely　local　duties　（an　amount　of　separation　which　exists　under　all　governments）；　but　the　popular　control　over　those　officers　can　only　be　advantageously　exerted　through　a　separate　organ。　Their　original　appointment；　the　function　of　watching　and　checking　them；　the　duty　of　providing；　or　the　discretion　of　withholding；　the　supplies　necessary　for　their　operations；　should　rest；　not　with　the　national　Parliament　or　the　national　executive；　but　with　the　people　of　the　locality。　In　some　of　the　New　England　States　these　functions　are　still　exercised　directly　by　the　assembled　people；　it　is　said　with　better　results　than　might　be　expected；　and　those　highly　educated　communities　are　so　well　satisfied　with　this　primitive　mode　of　local　government；　that　they　have　no　desire　to　exchange　it　for　the　only　representative　system　they　are　acquainted　with；　by　which　all　minorities　are　disfranchised。　Such　very　peculiar　circumstances；　however；　are　required　to　make　this　arrangement　work　tolerably　in　practice；　that　recourse　must　generally　be　had　to　the　plan　of　representative　sub…Parliaments　for　local　affairs。　These　exist　in　England；　but　very　incompletely；　and　with　great　irregularity　and　want　of　system：　in　some　other　countries　much　less　popularly　governed　their　constitution　is　far　more　rational。　In　England　there　has　always　been　more　liberty；　but　worse　organisation；　while　in　other　countries　there　is　better　organis