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on sense and the sensible-第12部分

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the contradictory of the above hypothesis (of different parts of



Soul remaining engaged in simultaneous perception with one sense) is



what emerges from the analogy'; while if the two parts of Soul



remain separate; the analogy of the eyes will fail; 'for of these some



one is really formed'。



  Furthermore; 'on the supposition of the need of different parts of



Soul; co…operating in each sense; to discern different objects



coinstantaneously'; the senses will be each at the same time one and



many; as if we should say that they were each a set of diverse



sciences; for neither will an 'activity' exist without its proper



faculty; nor without activity will there be sensation。



  But if the Soul does not; in the way suggested 'i。e。 with



different parts of itself acting simultaneously'; perceive in one



and the same individual time sensibles of the same sense; a fortiori



it is not thus that it perceives sensibles of different senses。 For it



is; as already stated; more conceivable that it should perceive a



plurality of the former together in this way than a plurality of



heterogeneous objects。



  If then; as is the fact; the Soul with one part perceives Sweet;



with another; White; either that which results from these is some



one part; or else there is no such one resultant。 But there must be



such an one; inasmuch as the general faculty of sense…perception is



one。 What one object; then; does that one faculty 'when perceiving



an object; e。g。 as both White and Sweet' perceive? 'None'; for



assuredly no one object arises by composition of these



'heterogeneous objects; such as White and Sweet'。 We must conclude;



therefore; that there is; as has been stated before; some one



faculty in the soul with which the latter perceives all its



percepts; though it perceives each different genus of sensibles



through a different organ。



  May we not; then; conceive this faculty which perceives White and



Sweet to be one qua indivisible 'sc。 qua combining its different



simultaneous objects' in its actualization; but different; when it has



become divisible 'sc。 qua distinguishing its different simultaneous



objects' in its actualization?



  Or is what occurs in the case of the perceiving Soul conceivably



analogous to what holds true in that of the things themselves? For the



same numerically one thing is white and sweet; and has many other



qualities; 'while its numerical oneness is not thereby prejudiced'



if the fact is not that the qualities are really separable in the



object from one another; but that the being of each quality is



different 'from that of every other'。 In the same way therefore we



must assume also; in the case of the Soul; that the faculty of



perception in general is in itself numerically one and the same; but



different 'differentiated' in its being; different; that is to say; in



genus as regards some of its objects; in species as regards others。



Hence too; we may conclude that one can perceive 'numerically



different objects' coinstantaneously with a faculty which is



numerically one and the same; but not the same in its relationship



'sc。 according as the objects to which it is directed are not the



same'。



  That every sensible object is a magnitude; and that nothing which it



is possible to perceive is indivisible; may be thus shown。 The



distance whence an object could not be seen is indeterminate; but that



whence it is visible is determinate。 We may say the same of the



objects of Smelling and Hearing; and of all sensibles not discerned by



actual contact。 Now; there is; in the interval of distance; some



extreme place; the last from which the object is invisible; and the



first from which it is visible。 This place; beyond which if the object



be one cannot perceive it; while if the object be on the hither side



one must perceive it; is; I presume; itself necessarily indivisible。



Therefore; if any sensible object be indivisible; such object; if



set in the said extreme place whence imperceptibility ends and



perceptibility begins; will have to be both visible and invisible



their objects; whether regarded in general or at the same time; but



this is impossible。



  This concludes our survey of the characteristics of the organs of



Sense…perception and their objects; whether regarded in general or



in relation to each organ。 Of the remaining subjects; we must first



consider that of memory and remembering。











                                 …THE END…





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