the critique of judgement-第15部分

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；　like　all　empirical　rules；　general　only；　not　universal；　the　latter　being　what　the　judgement　of　taste　upon　the　beautiful　deals　or　claims　to　deal　in。　It　is　a　judgement　in　respect　of　sociability　so　far　as　resting　on　empirical　rules。　In　respect　of　the　good；　it　is　true　that　judgements　also　rightly　assert　a　claim　to　validity　for　every　one；　but　the　good　is　only　represented　as　an　object　of　universal　delight　by　means　of　a　concept；　which　is　the　case　neither　with　the　agreeable　nor　the　beautiful。

　　　　　　　SS　8。　In　a　judgement　of　taste　the　universality　of　　　　　　　　　　　delight　is　only　represented　as　subjective。

　　This　particular　form　of　the　universality　of　an　aesthetic　judgement；　which　is　to　be　met　in　a　judgement　of　taste；　is　a　significant　feature；　not　for　the　logician　certainly；　but　for　the　transcendental　philosopher。　It　calls　for　no　small　effort　on　his　part　to　discover　its　origin；　but　in　return　it　brings　to　light　a　property　of　our　cognitive　faculty　which；　without　this　analysis；　would　have　remained　unknown。　　　First；　one　must　get　firmly　into　one's　mind　that　by　the　judgement　of　taste　（upon　the　beautiful）　the　delight　in　an　object　is　imputed　to　every　one；　yet　without　being　founded　on　a　concept　（for　then　it　would　be　the　good）；　and　that　this　claim　to　universality　is　such　an　essential　factor　of　a　judgement　by　which　we　describe　anything　as　beautiful；　that　were　it　not　for　its　being　present　to　the　mind　it　would　never　enter　into　any　one's　head　to　use　this　expression；　but　everything　that　pleased　without　a　concept　would　be　ranked　as　agreeable。　For　in　respect　of　the　agreeable；　every　one　is　allowed　to　have　his　own　opinion；　and　no　one　insists　upon　others　agreeing　with　his　judgement　of　taste；　which　is　what　is　invariably　done　in　the　judgement　of　taste　about　beauty。　The　first　of　these　I　may　call　the　taste　of　sense；　the　second；　the　taste　of　reflection：　the　first　laying　down　judgements　merely　private；　the　second；　on　the　other　hand；　judgements　ostensibly　of　general　validity　（public）；　but　both　alike　being　aesthetic　（not　practical）　judgements　about　an　object　merely　in　respect　of　the　bearings　of　its　representation　on　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure。　Now　it　does　seem　strange　that　while　with　the　taste　of　sense　it　is　not　alone　experience　that　shows　that　its　judgement　（of　pleasure　or　displeasure　in　something）　is　not　universally　valid；　but　every　one　willingly　refrains　from　imputing　this　agreement　to　others　（despite　the　frequent　actual　prevalence　of　a　considerable　consensus　of　general　opinion　even　in　these　judgements）；　the　taste　of　reflection；　which；　as　experience　teaches；　has　often　enough　to　put　up　with　a　rude　dismissal　of　its　claims　to　universal　validity　of　its　judgement　（upon　the　beautiful）；　can　（as　it　actually　does）　find　it　possible　for　all　that　to　formulate　judgements　capable　of　demanding　this　agreement　in　its　universality。　Such　agreement　it　does　in　fact　require　from　every　one　for　each　of　its　judgements　of　taste　the　persons　who　pass　these　judgements　not　quarreling　over　the　possibility　of　such　a　claim；　but　only　failing　in　particular　cases　to　come　to　terms　as　to　the　correct　application　of　this　faculty。　　　First　of　all　we　have　here　to　note　that　a　universality　which　does　not　rest　upon　concepts　of　the　object　（even　though　these　are　only　empirical）　is　in　no　way　logical；　but　aesthetic；　i。　e。；　does　not　involve　any　objective　quantity　of　the　judgement；　but　only　one　that　is　subjective。　For　this　universality　I　use　the　expression　general　validity；　which　denotes　the　validity　of　the　reference　of　a　representation；　not　to　the　cognitive　faculties；　but　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure　for　every　subject。　（The　same　expression；　however；　may　also　be　employed　for　the　logical　quantity　of　the　judgement；　provided　we　add　objective　universal　validity；　to　distinguish　it　from　the　merely　subjective　validity　which　is　always　aesthetic。）　　　Now　a　judgement　that　has　objective　universal　validity　has　always　got　the　subjective　also；　i。e。；　if　the　judgement　is　valid　for　everything　which　is　contained　under　a　given　concept；　it　is　valid　also　for　all　who　represent　an　object　by　means　of　this　concept。　But　from　a　subjective　universal　validity；　i。　e。；　the　aesthetic；　that　does　not　rest　on　any　concept；　no　conclusion　can　be　drawn　to　the　logical；　because　judgements　of　that　kind　have　no　bearing　upon　the　object。　But　for　this　very　reason　the　aesthetic　universality　attributed　to　a　judgement　must　also　be　of　a　special　kind；　seeing　that　it　does　not　join　the　predicate　of　beauty　to　the　concept　of　the　object　taken　in　its　entire　logical　sphere；　and　yet　does　extend　this　predicate　over　the　whole　sphere　of　judging　subjects。　　　In　their　logical　quantity；　all　judgements　of　taste　are　singular　judgements。　For；　since　I　must　present　the　object　immediately　to　my　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure；　and　that；　too；　without　the　aid　of　concepts；　such　judgements　cannot　have　the　quantity　of　judgements　with　objective　general　validity。　Yet　by　taking　the　singular　representation　of　the　object　of　the　judgement　of　taste；　and　by　comparison　converting　it　into　a　concept　according　to　the　conditions　determining　that　judgement；　we　can　arrive　at　a　logically　universal　judgement。　For　instance；　by　a　judgement　of　the　taste　I　describe　the　rose　at　which　I　am　looking　as　beautiful。　The　judgement；　on　the　other　hand；　resulting　from　the　comparison　of　a　number　of　singular　representations：　〃Roses　in　general　are　beautiful；〃　is　no　longer　pronounced　as　a　purely　aesthetic　judgement；　but　as　a　logical　judgement　founded　on　one　that　is　aesthetic。　Now　the　judgement；　〃The　rose　is　agreeable〃　（to　smell）　is　also；　no　doubt；　an　aesthetic　and　singular　judgement；　but　then　it　is　not　one　of　taste　but　of　sense。　For　it　has　this　point　of　difference　from　a　judgement　of　taste；　that　the　latter　imports　an　aesthetic　quantity　of　universality；　i。e。；　of　validity　for　everyone　which　is　not　to　be　met　with　in　a　judgement　upon　the　agreeable。　It　is　only　judgements　upon　the　good　which；　while　also　determining　the　delight　in　an　object；　possess　logical　and　not　mere　aesthetic　universality；　for　it　is　as　involving　a　cognition　of　the　object　that　〃they　are　valid　of　it；　and　on　that　account　valid　for　everyone。　　　In　forming　an　estimate　of　objects　merely　from　concepts；　all　representation　of　beauty　goes　by　the　board。　There　can；　therefore；　be　no　rule　according　to　which　any　one　is　to　be　compelled　to　recognize　anything　as　beautiful。　Whether　a　dress；　a　house；　or　a　flower　is　beautiful　is　a　matter　upon　which　one　declines　to　allow　one's　judgement　to　be　swayed　by　any　reasons　or　principles。　We　want　to　get　a　look　at　the　object　with　our　own　eyes；　just　as　if　our　delight　depended　on　sensation。　And　yet；　if　upon　so　doing；　we　call　the　object　beautiful；　we　believe　ourselves　to　be　speaking　with　a　universal　voice；　and　lay　claim　to　the　concurrence　of　everyone；　whereas　no　private　sensation　would　be　decisive　except　for　the　observer　alone　and　his　liking。　　　　Here；　now；　we　may　perceive　that　nothing　is　postulated　in　the　judgement　of　taste　but　such　a　universal　voice　in　respect　of　delight　that　it　is　not　mediated　by　concepts；　consequently；　only　the　possibility　of　an　aesthetic　judgement　capable　of　being　at　the　same　time　deemed　valid　for　everyone。　The　judgement　of　taste　itself　does　not　postulate　the　agreement　of　everyone　（for　it　is　only　co