the critique of judgement-第16部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


ryone。　The　judgement　of　taste　itself　does　not　postulate　the　agreement　of　everyone　（for　it　is　only　competent　for　a　logically　universal　judgement　to　do　this；　in　that　it　is　able　to　bring　forward　reasons）；　it　only　imputes　this　agreement　to　everyone；　as　an　instance　of　the　rule　in　respect　of　which　it　looks　for　confirmation；　not　from　concepts；　but　from　the　concurrence　of　others。　The　universal　voice　is；　therefore；　only　an　idea　…resting　upon　grounds　the　investigation　of　which　is　here　postponed。　It　may　be　a　matter　of　uncertainty　whether　a　person　who　thinks　he　is　laying　down　a　judgement　of　taste　is；　in　fact；　judging　in　conformity　with　that　idea；　but　that　this　idea　is　what　is　contemplated　in　his　judgement；　and　that；　consequently；　it　is　meant　to　be　a　judgement　of　taste；　is　proclaimed　by　his　use　of　the　expression　〃beauty。〃　For　himself　he　can　be　certain　on　the　point　from　his　mere　consciousness　of　the　separation　of　everything　belonging　to　the　agreeable　and　the　good　from　the　delight　remaining　to　him；　and　this　is　all　for　which　be　promises　himself　the　agreement　of　everyone…a　claim　which；　under　these　conditions；　he　would　also　be　warranted　in　making；　were　it　not　that　he　frequently　sinned　against　them；　and　thus　passed　an　erroneous　judgement　of　taste。

　　　　　SS　9。　Investigation　of　the　question　of　the　relative　　　　　　　priority　in　a　judgement　of　taste　of　the　feeling　　　　　　　　of　pleasure　and　the　estimating　of　the　object。

　　The　solution　of　this　problem　is　the　key　to　the　Critique　of　taste；　and　so　is　worthy　of　all　attention。　　　Were　the　pleasure　in　a　given　object　to　be　the　antecedent；　and　were　the　universal　communicability　of　this　pleasure　to　be　all　that　the　judgement　of　taste　is　meant　to　allow　to　the　representation　of　the　object；　such　a　sequence　would　be　self…contradictory。　For　a　pleasure　of　that　kind　would　be　nothing　but　the　feeling　of　mere　agreeableness　to　the　senses；　and　so；　from　its　very　nature；　would　possess　no　more　than　private　validity；　seeing　that　it　would　be　immediately　dependent　on　the　representation　through　which　the　object　is　given。　　　Hence　it　is　the　universal　capacity　for　being　communicated　incident　to　the　mental　state　in　the　given　representation　which；　as　the　subjective　condition　of　the　judgement　of　taste；　must　be；　fundamental；　with　the　pleasure　in　the　object　as　its　consequent。　Nothing；　however；　is　capable　of　being　universally　communicated　but　cognition　and　representation　so　far　as　appurtenant　to　cognition。　For　it　is　only　as　thus　appurtenant　that　the　representation　is　objective；　and　it　is　this　alone　that　gives　it　a　universal　point　of　reference　with　which　the　power　of　representation　of　every　one　is　obliged　to　harmonize。　If；　then；　the　determining　ground　of　the　judgement　as　to　this　universal　communicability　of　the　representation　is　to　be　merely　subjective；　that　is　to　say；　to　be　conceived　independently　of　any　concept　of　the　object；　it　can　be　nothing　else　than　the　mental　state　that　presents　itself　in　the　mutual　relation　of　the　powers　of　representation　so　far　as　they　refer　a　given　representation　to　cognition　in　general。　　　The　cognitive　powers　brought　into　play　by　this　representation　are　here　engaged　in　a　free　play；　since　no　definite　concept　restricts　them　to　a　particular　rule　of　cognition。　Hence　the　mental　state　in　this　representation　must　be　one　of　a　feeling　of　the　free　play　of　the　powers　of　representation　in　a　given　representation　for　a　cognition　in　general。　Now　a　representation；　whereby　an　object　is　given；　involves；　in　order　that　it　may　become　a　source　of　cognition　at　all；　imagination　for　bringing　together　the　manifold　of　intuition；　and　understanding　for　the　unity　of　the　concept　uniting　the　representations。　This　state　of　free　play　of　the　cognitive　faculties　attending　a　representation　by　which　an　object　is　given　must　admit　of　universal　communication：　because　cognition；　as　a　definition　of　the　object　with　which　given　representations　（in　any　subject　whatever）　are　to　accord；　is　the　one　and　only　representation　which　is　valid　for　everyone。　　　As　the　subjective　universal　communicability　of　the　mode　of　representation　in　a　judgement　of　taste　is　to　subsist　apart　from　the　presupposition　of　any　definite　concept；　it　can　be　nothing　else　than　the　mental　state　present　in　the　free　play　of　imagination　and　understanding　（so　far　as　these　are　in　mutual　accord；　as　is　requisite　for　cognition　in　general）；　for　we　are　conscious　that　this　subjective　relation　suitable　for　a　cognition　in　general　must　be　just　as　valid　for　every　one；　and　consequently　as　universally　communicable；　as　is　any　indeterminate　cognition；　which　always　rests　upon　that　relation　as　its　subjective　condition。　　　Now　this　purely　subjective　（aesthetic）　estimating　of　the　object；　or　of　the　representation　through　which　it　is　given；　is　antecedent　to　the　pleasure　in　it；　and　is　the　basis　of　this　pleasure　in　the　harmony　of　the　cognitive　faculties。　Again；　the　above…described　universality　of　the　subjective　conditions　of　estimating　objects　forms　the　sole　foundation　of　this　universal　subjective　validity　of　the　delight　which　we　connect　with　the　representation　of　the　object　that　we　call　beautiful。　　　That　an　ability　to　communicate　one's　mental　state；　even　though　it　be　only　in　respect　of　our　cognitive　faculties；　is　attended　with　a　pleasure；　is　a　fact　which　might　easily　be　demonstrated　from　the　natural　propensity　of　mankind　to　social　life；　i。e。；　empirically　and　psychologically。　But　what　we　have　here　in　view　calls　for　something　more　than　this。　In　a　judgement　of　taste；　the　pleasure　felt　by　us　is　exacted　from　every　one　else　as　necessary；　just　as　if；　when　we　call　something　beautiful；　beauty　was　to　be　regarded　as　a　quality　of　the　object　forming　part　of　its　inherent　determination　according　to　concepts；　although　beauty　is　for　itself；　apart　from　any　reference　to　the　feeling　of　the　subject；　nothing。　But　the　discussion　of　this　question　must　be　reserved　until　we　have　answered　the　further　one　of　whether；　and　how；　aesthetic　judgements　are　possible　a　priori。　　　At　present　we　are　exercised　with　the　lesser　question　of　the　way　in　which　we　become　conscious；　in　a　judgement　of　taste；　of　a　reciprocal　subjective　common　accord　of　the　powers　of　cognition。　Is　it　aesthetically　by　sensation　and　our　mere　internal　sense？　Or　is　it　intellectually　by　consciousness　of　our　intentional　activity　in　bringing　these　powers　into　play？　　　Now　if　the　given　representation　occasioning　the　judgement　of　taste　were　a　concept　which　united　understanding　and　imagination　in　the　estimate　of　the　object　so　as　to　give　a　cognition　of　the　object；　the　consciousness　of　this　relation　would　be　intellectual　（as　in　the　objective　schematism　of　judgement　dealt　with　in　the　Critique）。　But；　then；　in　that　case　the　judgement　would　not　be　laid　down　with　respect　to　pleasure　and　displeasure；　and　so　would　not　be　a　judgement　of　taste。　But；　now；　the　judgement　of　taste　determines　the　object；　independently　of　concepts；　in　respect　of　delight　and　of　the　predicate　of　beauty。　There　is；　therefore；　no　other　way　for　the　subjective　unity　of　the　relation　in　question　to　make　itself　known　than　by　sensation。　The　quickening　of　both　faculties　（imagination　and　understanding）　to　an　indefinite；　but　yet；　thanks　to　the　given　representation；　harmonious　activity；　such　as　belongs　to　cognition　generally；　is　the　sensation　whose　uni