the critique of judgement-第43部分

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freedom　stirs　the　understanding；　and　the　understanding　apart　from　concepts　puts　the　imagination　into　regular　play；　does　the　representation　communicate　itself　not　as　thought；　but　as　an　internal　feeling　of　a　final　state　of　the　mind。　　　Taste　is；　therefore；　the　faculty　of　forming　an　a　priori　estimate　of　the　communicability　of　the　feeling　that；　without　the　mediation　of　a　concept；　are　connected　with　a　given　representation。　　　Supposing；　now；　that　we　could　assume　that　the　mere　universal　communicability　of　our　feeling　must　of　itself　carry　with　it　an　interest　for　us　（an　assumption；　however；　which　we　are　not　entitled　to　draw　as　a　conclusion　from　the　character　of　a　merely　reflective　judgement）；　we　should　then　be　in　a　position　to　explain　how　the　feeling　in　the　judgement　of　taste　comes　to　be　exacted　from　everyone　as　a　sort　of　duty。

　　　　　　　　SS　41。　The　empirical　interest　in　the　beautiful。

　　Abundant　proof　bas　been　given　above　to　show　that　the　judgement　of　taste　by　which　something　is　declared　beautiful　must　have　no　interest　as　its　determining　ground。　But　it　does　not　follow　from　this　that；　after　it　has　once　been　posited　as　a　pure　aesthetic　judgement；　an　interest　cannot　then　enter　into　combination　with　it。　This　combination；　however；　can　never　be　anything　but　indirect。　Taste　must；　that　is　to　say；　first　of　all　be　represented　in　conjunction　with　something　else；　if　the　delight　attending　the　mere　reflection　upon　an　object　is　to　admit　of　having　further　conjoined　with　it　a　pleasure　in　the　real　existence　of　the　object　（as　that　wherein　all　interest　consists）。　For　the　saying；　a　posse　ad　esse　non　valet　consequentia；*　which　is　applied　to　cognitive　judgements；　holds　good　here　in　the　case　of　aesthetic　judgements。　Now　this　〃something　else〃　may　be　something　empirical；　such　as　an　inclination　proper　to　the　nature　of　human　beings；　or　it　may　be　something　intellectual；　as　a　property　of　the　will　whereby　it　admits　of　rational　determination　a　priori。　Both　of　these　involve　a　delight　in　the　existence　of　the　object；　and　so　can　lay　the　foundation　for　an　interest　in　what　has　already　pleased　of　itself　and　without　regard　to　any　interest　whatsoever。

　　*＇〃From　possibility　to　actuality。〃＇

　　The　empirical　interest　in　the　beautiful　exists　only　in　society。　And　if　we　admit　that　the　impulse　to　society　is　natural　to　mankind；　and　that　the　suitability　for　and　the　propensity　towards　it；　i。e。；　sociability；　is　a　property　essential　to　the　requirements　of　man　as　a　creature　intended　for　society；　and　one；　therefore；　that　belongs　to　humanity；　it　is　inevitable　that　we　should　also　look　upon　taste　in　the　light　of　a　faculty　for　estimating　whatever　enables　us　to　communicate　even　our　feeling　to　every　one　else；　and　hence　as　a　means　of　promoting　that　upon　which　the　natural　inclination　of　everyone　is　set。　　　With　no　one　to　take　into　account　but　himself；　a　man　abandoned　on　a　desert　island　would　not　adorn　either　himself　or　his　hut；　nor　would　he　look　for　flowers；　and　still　less　plant　them；　with　the　object　of　providing　himself　with　personal　adornments。　Only　in　society　does　it　occur　to　him　to　be　not　merely　a　man；　but　a　man　refined　after　the　manner　of　his　kind　（the　beginning　of　civilization）…for　that　is　the　estimate　formed　of　one　who　has　the　bent　and　turn　for　communicating　his　pleasure　to　others；　and　who　is　not　quite　satisfied　with　an　object　unless　his　feeling　of　delight　in　it　can　be　shared　in　communion　with　others。　Further；　a　regard　to　universal　communicability　is　a　thing　which　every　one　expects　and　requires　from　every　one　else；　just　as　if　it　were　part　of　an　original　compact　dictated　by　humanity　itself。　And　thus；　no　doubt；　at　first　only　charms；　e。g。；　colours　for　painting　oneself　（roucou　among　the　Caribs　and　cinnabar　among　the　Iroquois）；　or　flowers；　sea…shells；　beautifully　coloured　feathers；　then；　in　the　course　of　time；　also　beautiful　forms　（as　in　canoes；　wearing…apparel；　etc。）　which　convey　no　gratification；　i。e。；　delight　of　enjoyment；　become　of　moment　in　society　and　attract　a　considerable　interest。　Eventually；　when　civilization　has　reached　its　height　it　makes　this　work　of　communication　almost　the　main　business　of　refined　inclination；　and　the　entire　value　of　sensations　is　placed　in　the　degree　to　which　they　permit　of　universal　communication。　At　this　stage；　then；　even　where　the　pleasure　which　each　one　has　in　an　object　is　but　insignificant　and　possesses　of　itself　no　conspicuous　interest；　still　the　idea　of　its　universal　communicability　almost　indefinitely　augments　its　value。　　　This　interest；　indirectly　attached　to　the　beautiful　by　the　inclination　towards　society；　and；　consequently；　empirical；　is；　however；　of　no　importance　for　us　here。　For　that　to　which　we　have　alone　to　look　is　what　can　have　a　bearing　a　priori；　even　though　indirect；　upon　the　judgement　of　taste。　For；　if　even　in　this　form　an　associated　interest　should　betray　itself；　taste　would　then　reveal　a　transition　on　the　part　of　our　critical　faculty。　from　the　enjoyment　of　sense　to　the　moral　feeling。　This　would　not　merely　mean　that　we　should　be　supplied　with　a　more　effectual　guide　for　the　final　employment　of　taste；　but　taste　would　further　be　presented　as　a　link　in　the　chain'　of　the　human　faculties　a　priori　upon　which　all　legislation；　depend。　This　much　may　certainly　be　said　of　the　empirical　interest　in　objects　of　taste；　and　in　taste　itself；　that　as　taste　thus　pays　homage　to　inclination；　however　refined；　such　interest　will　nevertheless　readily　fuse　also　with　all　inclinations　and　passions；　which　in　society　attain　to　their　greatest　variety　and　highest　degree；　and　the　interest　in　the　beautiful；　if　this　is　made　its　ground；　can　but　afford　a　very　ambiguous　transition　from　the　agreeable　to　the　good。　We　have　reason；　however；　to　inquire　whether　this　transition　may　not　still　in　some　way　be　furthered　by　means　of　taste　when　taken　in　its　purity。

　　　　　　SS　42。　The　intellectual　interest　in　the　beautiful。

　　It　has　been　with　the　best　intentions　that　those　who　love　to　see　in　the　ultimate　end　of　humanity；　namely　the　morally　good；　the　goal　of　all　activities　to　which　men　are　impelled　by　the　inner　bent　of　their　nature；　have　regarded　it　as　a　mark　of　a　good　moral　character　to　take　an　interest　in　the　beautiful　generally。　But　they　have；　not　without　reason；　been　contradicted；　by　others；　who　appeal　to　the　fact　of　experience；　that　virtuosi　in　matters　of　taste　being　not　alone　often；　but　one　might　say　as　a　general　rule；　vain；　capricious；　and　addicted　to　injurious　passions；　could　perhaps　more　rarely　than　others　lay　claim　to　any　pre…eminent　attachment　to　moral　principles。　And　so　it　would　seem；　not　only　that　the　feeling　for　the　beautiful　is　specifically　different　from　the　moral　feeling　（which　as　a　matter　of　fact　is　the　case）；　but　also　that　the　interest　which　we　may　combine　with　it　will　hardly　consort　with　the　moral；　and　certainly　not　on　grounds　of　inner　affinity。　　　Now　I　willingly　admit　that　the　interest　in　the　beautiful　of　art　（including　under　this　heading　the　artificial　use　of　natural　beauties　for　personal　adornment；　and　so　from　vanity）　gives　no　evidence　at　all　of　a　habit　of　mind　attached　to　the　morally　good；　or　even　inclined　that　way。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　I　do　maintain　that　to　take　an　immediate　interest　in　the　beauty　of　nature　（not　merely　to　have　taste　in　estimating　it）　is　always