the critique of judgement-第44部分

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　an　immediate　interest　in　the　beauty　of　nature　（not　merely　to　have　taste　in　estimating　it）　is　always　a　mark　of　a　good　soul；　and　that；　where　this　interest　is　habitual；　it　is　at　least　indicative　of　a　temper　of　mind　favourable　to　the　moral　feeling　that　it　should　readily　associate　itself　with　the　contemplation　of　nature。　It　must；　however；　be　borne　in　mind　that　I　mean　to　refer　strictly　to　the　beautiful　forms　of　nature；　and　to　put　to　one　side　the　charms　which　she　is　wont　so　lavishly　to　combine　with　them；　because；　though　the　interest　in　these　is　no　doubt　immediate；　it　is　nevertheless　empirical。　　　One　who　alone　（and　without　any　intention　of　communicating　his　observations　to　others）　regards　the　beautiful　form　of　a　wild　flower；　a　bird；　an　insect；　or　the　like；　out　of　admiration　and　love　of　them；　and　being　loath　to　let　them　escape　him　in　nature；　even　at　the　risk　of　some　misadventure　to　himself…so　far　from　there　being　any　prospect　of　advantage　to　him…such　a　one　takes　an　immediate；　and　in　fact　intellectual；　interest　in　the　beauty　of　nature。　This　means　that　he　is　not　alone　pleased　with　nature's　product　in　respect　of　its　form；　but　is　also　pleased　at　its　existence；　and　is　so　without　any　charm　of　sense　having　a　share　in　the　matter；　or　without　his　associating　with　it　any　end　whatsoever。　　　In　this　connection；　however；　it　is　of　note　that　were　we　to　play　a　trick　on　our　lover　of　the　beautiful；　and　plant　in　the　ground　artificial　flowers　（which　can　be　made　so　as　to　look　just　like　natural　ones）；　and　perch　artfully　carved　birds　on　the　branches　of　trees；　and　he　were　to　find　out　how　he　had　been　taken　in；　the　immediate　interest　which　these　things　previously　had　for　him　would　at　once　vanish…though；　perhaps；　a　different　interest　might　intervene　in　its　stead；　that；　namely；　of　vanity　in　decorating　his　room　with　them　for　the　eyes　of　others。　The　fact　is　that　our　intuition　and　reflection　must　have　as　their　concomitant　the　thought　that　the　beauty　in　question　is　nature's　handiwork；　and　this　is　the　sole　basis　of　the　immediate　interest　that　is　taken　in　it。　Failing　this；　we　are　either　left　with　a　bare　judgement　of　taste　void　of　all　interest　whatever；　or　else　only　with　one　that　is　combined　with　an　interest　that　is　mediate；　involving；　namely；　a　reference　to　society；　which　latter　affords　no　reliable　indication　of　morally　good　habits　of　thought。　　　The　superiority　which　natural　beauty　has　over　that　of　art；　even　where　it　is　excelled　by　the　latter　in　point　of　form；　in　yet　being　alone　able　to　awaken　an　immediate　interest；　accords　with　the　refined　and　well…grounded　habits　of　thought　of　all　men　who　have　cultivated　their　moral　feeling。　If　a　man　with　taste　enough　to　judge　of　works　of　fine　art　with　the　greatest　correctness　and　refinement　readily　quits　the　room　in　which　he　meets　with　those　beauties　that　minister　to　vanity　or；　at　least；　social　joys；　and　betakes　himself　to　the　beautiful　in　nature；　so　that　he　may　there　find　as　it　were　a　feast　for　his　soul　in　a　train　of　thought　which　he　can　never　completely　evolve；　we　will　then　regard　this　his　choice　even　with　veneration；　and　give　him　credit　for　a　beautiful　soul；　to　which　no　connoisseur　or　art　collector　can　lay　claim　on　the　score　of　the　interest　which　his　objects　have　for　him。　Here；　now；　are　two　kinds　of　objects　which　in　the　judgement　of　mere　taste　could　scarcely　contend　with　one　another　for　a　superiority。　What　then；　is　the　distinction　that　makes　us　hold　them　in　such　different　esteem？　　　We　have　a　faculty　of　judgement　which　is　merely　aesthetic…a　faculty　of　judging　of　forms　without　the　aid　of　concepts；　and　of　finding；　in　the　mere　estimate　of　them；　a　delight　that　we　at　the　same　time　make　into　a　rule　for　every　one；　without　this　judgement　being　founded　on　an　interest；　or　yet　producing　one。　On　the　other　hand；　we　have　also　a　faculty　of　intellectual　judgement　for　the　mere　forms　of　practical　maxims　（so　far　as　they　are　of　themselves　qualified　for　universal　legislation）…a　faculty　of　determining　an　a　priori　delight；　which　we　make　into　a　law　for　everyone；　without　our　judgement　being　founded　on　any　interest；　though　here　it　produces　one。　The　pleasure　or　displeasure　in　the　former　judgement　is　called　that　of　taste；　the　latter　is　called　that　of　the　moral　feeling。　　　But；　now；　reason　is　further　interested　in　ideas　（for　which　in　our　moral　feeling　it　brings　about　an　immediate　interest）；　having　also　objective　reality。　That　is　to　say；　it　is　of　interest　to　reason　that　nature　should　at　least　show　a　trace　or　give　a　hint　that　it　contains　in　itself　some　ground　or　other　for　assuming　a　uniform　accordance　of　its　products　with　our　wholly　disinterested　delight　（a　delight　which　we　cognize…a　priori　as　a　law　for　every　one　without　being　able　to　ground　it　upon　proofs）。　That　being　so；　reason　must　take　an　interest　in　every　manifestation　on　the　part　of　nature　of　some　such　accordance。　Hence　the　mind　cannot　reflect　on　the　beauty　of　nature　without　at　the　same　time　finding　its　interest　engaged。　But　this　interest　is　akin　to　the　moral。　One；　then；　who　takes　such　an　interest　in　the　beautiful　in　nature　can　only　do　so　in　so　far　as　he　has　previously　set　his　interest　deep　in　the　foundations　of　the　morally　good。　On　these　grounds　we　have　reason　for　presuming　the　presence　of　at　least　the　germ　of　a　good　moral　disposition　in　the　case　of　a　man　to　whom　the　beauty　of　nature　is　a　matter　of　immediate　interest。　　　It　will　be　said　that　this　interpretation　of　aesthetic　judgements　on　the　basis　of　kinship　with　our　moral　feeling　has　far　too　studied　an　appearance　to　be　accepted　as　the　true　construction　of　the　cypher　in　which　nature　speaks　to　us　figuratively　in　its　beautiful　forms。　But；　first　of　all；　this　immediate　interest　in　the　beauty　of　nature　is　not　in　fact　common。　It　is　peculiar　to　those　whose　habits　of　thought　are　already　trained　to　the　good　or　else　are　eminently　susceptible　of　such　training；　and　under　the　circumstances　the　analogy　in　which　the　pure　judgement　of　taste　that；　without　relying　upon　any　interest；　gives　us　a　feeling　of　delight；　and　at　the　same　time　represents　it　a　priori　as　proper　to　mankind　in　general；　stands　to　the　moral　judgement　that　does　just　the　same　from　concepts；　is　one　which；　without　any　clear；　subtle；　and　deliberate　reflection；　conduces　to　a　like　immediate　interest　being　taken　in　the　objects　of　the　former　judgement　as　in　those　of　the　latter…with　this　one　difference；　that　the　interest　in　the　first　case　is　free；　while　in　the　latter　it　is　one　founded　on　objective　laws。　In　addition　to　this；　there　is　our　admiration　of　Nature；　which　in　her　beautiful　products　displays　herself　as　art；　not　as　mere　matter　of　chance；　but；　as　it　were；　designedly；　according　to　a　law…directed　arrangement；　and　as　finality　apart　from　any　end。　As　we　never　meet　with　such　an　end　outside　ourselves；　we　naturally　look　for　it　in　ourselves；　and；　in　fact；　in　that　which　constitutes　the　ultimate　end　of　our　existence…the　moral　side　of　our　being。　（The　inquiry　into　the　ground　of　the　possibility　of　such　a　natural　finality　will；　however；　first　come　under　discussion　in　the　Teleology。）　　　The　fact　that　the　delight　in　beautiful　art　does　not；　in　the　pure　judgement　of　taste；　involve　an　immediate　interest；　as　does　that　in　beautiful　nature；　may　be　readily　explained。　For　the　former　is　either　such　an　imitation　of　the　latter　as　goes　the　lengt