the critique of judgement-第57部分

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nd　thus　demands　a　certain　seriousness　in　its　presentation；　as　taste　does　in　estimating　it。

PART1｜SEC2　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART　CRITIQUE　OF　AESTHETIC　JUDGEMENT　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　II。　DIALECTIC　OF　AESTHETIC　JUDGEMENT。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　55。

　　For　a　power　of　judgement　to　be　dialectical　it　must　first　of　all　be　rationalizing；　that　is　to　say；　its　judgements　must　lay　claim　to　universality；*　and　do　so　a　priori；　for　it　is　in　the　antithesis　of　such　judgements　that　dialectic　consists。　Hence　there　is　nothing　dialectical　in　the　irreconcilability　of　aesthetic　judgements　of　sense　（upon　the　agreeable　and　disagreeable）。　And　in　so　far　as　each　person　appeals　merely　to　his　own　private　taste；　even　the　conflict　of　judgements　of　taste　does　not　form　a　dialectic　of　taste…for　no　one　is　proposing　to　make　his　own　judgement　into　a　universal　rule。　Hence　the　only　concept　left　to　us　of　a　dialectic　affecting　taste　is　one　of　a　dialectic　of　the　critique　of　taste　（not　of　taste　itself）　in　respect　of　its　principles：　for；　on　the　question　of　the　ground　of　the　possibility　of　judgements　of　taste　in　general；　mutually　conflicting　concepts　naturally　and　unavoidably　make　their　appearance。　The　transcendental　critique　of　taste　will；　therefore；　only　include　a　part　capable　of　bearing　the　name　of　a　dialectic　of　the　aesthetic　judgement　if　we　find　an　antinomy　of　the　principles　of　this　faculty　which　throws　doubt　upon　its　conformity　to　law；　and　hence　also　upon　its　inner　possibility。

　　*Any　judgement　which　sets　up　to　be　universal　may　be　termed　a　rationalizing　judgement　（indicium　ratiocinans）；　for　so　far　as　universal　it　may　serve　as　the　major　premiss　of　a　syllogism。　On　the　other　hand；　only　a　judgement　which　is　thought　as　the　conclusion　of　a　syllogism；　and；　therefore；　as　having　an　a　priori　foundation；　can　be　called　rational　（indicium　ratiocinatum）。

　　　　　　　SS　56。　Representation　of　the　antinomy　of　taste。

　　The　first　commonplace　of　taste　is　contained　in　the　proposition　under　cover　of　which　every　one　devoid　of　taste　thinks　to　shelter　himself　from　reproach：　every　one　has　his　own　taste。　This　is　only　another　way　of　saying　that　the　determining　ground　of　this　judgement　is　merely　subjective　（gratification　or　pain）；　and　that　the　judgement　has　no　right　to　the　necessary　agreement　of　others。　　　Its　second　commonplace；　to　which　even　those　resort　who　concede　the　right　of　the　judgement　of　taste　to　pronounce　with　validity　for　every　one；　is：　there　is　no　disputing　about　taste。　This　amounts　to　saying　that；　even　though　the　determining　ground　of　a　judgement　of　taste　be　objective；　it　is　not　reducible　to　definite　concepts；　so　that　in　respect　of　the　judgement　itself　no　decision　can　be　reached　by　proofs；　although　it　is　quite　open　to　us　to　contend　upon　the　matter；　and　to　contend　with　right。　For　though　contention　and　dispute　have　this　point　in　common；　that　they　aim　at　bringing　judgements　into　accordance　out　of　and　by　means　of　their　mutual　opposition；　yet　they　differ　in　the　latter　hoping　to　effect　this　from　definite　concepts；　as　grounds　of　proof；　and；　consequently；　adopting　objective　concepts　as　grounds　of　the　judgement。　But　where　this　is　considered　impracticable；　dispute　is　regarded　as　alike　out　of　the　question。　　　Between　these　two　commonplaces　an　intermediate　proposition　is　readily　seen　to　be　missing。　It　is　one　which　has　certainly　not　become　proverbial；　but　yet　it　is　at　the　back　of　every　one's　mind。　It　is　that　there　may　be　contention　about　taste　（although　not　a　dispute）。　This　proposition；　however；　involves　the　contrary　of　the　first　one。　For　in　a　manner　in　which　contention　is　to　be　allowed；　there　must　be　a：　hope　of　coming　to　terms。　Hence　one　must　be　able　to　reckon　on　grounds　of　judgement　that　possess　more　than　private　Validity　and　are　thus　not　merely　subjective。　And　yet　the　above　principle　（Every　one　has　his　own　taste）　is　directly　opposed　to　this。　　　The　principle　of　taste；　therefore；　exhibits　the　following　antinomy：　　　1。　Thesis。　The　judgement　of　taste　is　not　based　upon　concepts；　for；　if　it　were；　it　would　be　open　to　dispute　（decision　by　means　of　proofs）。　　　2。　Antithesis。　The　judgement　of　taste　is　based　on　concepts；　for　otherwise；　despite　diversity　of　judgement；　there　could　be　no　room　even　for　contention　in　the　matter　（a　claim　to　the　necessary　agreement　of　others　with　this　judgement）。

　　　　　　　　　　　SS　57。　Solution　of　the　antinomy　of　taste。

　　There　is　no　possibility　of　removing　the　conflict　of　the　above　principles；　which　underlie　every　judgement　of　taste　（and　which　are　only　the　two　peculiarities　of　the　judgement　of　taste　previously　set　out　in　the　Analytic）　except　by　showing　that　the　concept　to　which　the　object　is　to　refer　in　a　judgement　of　this　kind　is　not　taken　in　the　same　sense　in　both　maxims　of　the　aesthetic　judgement；　that　this　double　sense；　or　point　of　view；　in　our　estimate；　is　necessary　for　our　power　of　transcendental　judgement；　and　that　nevertheless　the　false　appearance　arising　from　the　confusion　of　one　with　the　other　is　a　natural　illusion；　and　so　unavoidable。　　　The　judgement　of　taste　must　have　reference　to　some　concept　or　other；　as　otherwise　it　would　be　absolutely　impossible　for　it　to　lay　claim　to　necessary　validity　for　every　one。　Yet　it　need　not　on　that　account　be　provable　from　a　concept。　For　a　concept　may　be　either　determinable；　or　else　at　once　intrinsically　undetermined　and　indeterminable。　A　concept　of　the　understanding；　which　is　determinable　by　means　of　predicates　borrowed　from　sensible　intuition　and　capable　of　corresponding　to　it；　is　of　the　first　kind。　But　of　the　second　kind　is　the　transcendental　rational　concept　of　the　supersensible；　which　lies　at　the　basis　of　all　that　sensible　intuition　and　is；　therefore；　incapable　of　being　further　determined　theoretically。　　　Now　the　judgement　of　taste　applies　to　objects　of　sense；　but　not　so　as　to　determine　a　concept　of　them　for　the　understanding；　for　it　is　not　a　cognitive　judgement。　Hence　it　is　a　singular　representation　of　intuition　referable　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　and；　as　such；　only　a　private　judgement。　And　to　that　extent　it　would　be　limited　in　its　validity　to　the　individual　judging：　the　object　is　for　me　an　object　of　delight；　for　others　it　may　be　otherwise；　every　one　to　his　taste。　　　For　all　that；　the　judgement　of　taste　contains　beyond　doubt　an　enlarged　reference　on　the　part　of　the　representation　of　the　object　（and　at　the　same　time　on　the　part　of　the　subject　also）；　which　lays　the　foundation　of　an　extension　of　judgements　of　this　kind　to　necessity　for　every　one。　This　must　of　necessity　be　founded　upon　some　concept　or　other；　but　such　a　concept　as　does　not　admit　of　being　determined　by　intuition；　and　affords　no　knowledge　of　anything。　Hence；　too；　it　is　a　concept　which　does　not　afford　proof　of　the　judgement　of　taste。　But　the　mere　pure　rational　concept　of　the　supersensible　lying　at　the　basis　of　the　object　（and　of　the　judging　subject　for　that　matter）　as　object　of　sense；　and　thus　as　phenomenon；　is　just　such　a　concept。　For　unless　such　a　point　of　view　were　adopted　there　would　be　no　means　of　saving　the　claim　of　the　judgement　of　taste　to　universal　validity。　And　if　the　concept　forming　the　required　basis　were　a　concept　of　understanding；　though　a　mere　confused　one；　as；　let　us　say；　of　perfection；　answering　to　which　the　sensible　intuition　of　the　beautiful　mig