the critique of judgement-第58部分

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d　one；　as；　let　us　say；　of　perfection；　answering　to　which　the　sensible　intuition　of　the　beautiful　might　be　adduced；　then　it　would　be　at　least　intrinsically　possible　to　found　the　judgement　of　taste　upon　proofs；　which　contradicts　the　thesis。　　　All　contradiction　disappears；　however；　if　I　say：　The　judgement　of　taste　does　depend　upon　a　concept　（of　a　general　ground　of　the　subjective　finality　of　nature　for　the　power　of　judgement）；　but　one　from　which　nothing　can　be　cognized　in　respect　of　the　object；　and　nothing　proved；　because　it　is　in　itself　indeterminable　and　useless　for　knowledge。　Yet；　by　means　of　this　very　concept；　it　acquires　at　the　same　time　validity　for　every　one　（but　with　each　individual；　no　doubt；　as　a　singular　judgement　immediately　accompanying　his　intuition）：　because　its　determining　ground　lies；　perhaps；　in　the　concept　of　what　may　be　regarded　as　the　supersensible　substrate　of　humanity。　　　The　solution　of　an　antinomy　turns　solely　on　the　possibility　of　two　apparently　conflicting　propositions　not　being　in　fact　contradictory；　but　rather　being　capable　of　consisting　together；　although　the　explanation　of　the　possibility　of　their　concept　transcends　our　faculties　of　cognition。　That　this　illusion　is　also　natural　and　for　human　reason　unavoidable；　as　well　as　why　it　is　so；　and　remains　so；　although　upon　the　solution　of　the　apparent　contradiction　it　no　longer　misleads　us；　may　be　made　intelligible　from　the　above　considerations。　　　For　the　concept；　which　the　universal　validity　of　a　judgement　must　have　for　its　basis；　is　taken　in　the　same　sense　in　both　the　conflicting　judgements；　yet　two　opposite　predicates　are　asserted　of　it。　The　thesis　should　therefore　read：　The　judgement　of　taste　is　not　based　on　determinate　concepts；　but　the　antithesis：　The　judgement　of　taste　does　rest　upon　a　concept；　although　an　indeterminate　one　（that；　namely；　of　the　supersensible　substrate　of　phenomena）；　and　then　there　would　be　no　conflict　between　them。　　　Beyond　removing　this　conflict　between　the　claims　and　counter…claims　of　taste　we　can　do　nothing。　To　supply　a　determinate　objective　principle　of　taste　in　accordance　with　which　its　judgements　might　be　derived；　tested；　and　proved；　is　an　absolute　impossibility；　for　then　it　would　not　be　a　judgement　of　taste。　The　subjective　principle…that　is　to　say；　the　indeterminate　idea　of　the　supersensible　within　us　…can　only　be　indicated　as　the　unique　key　to　the　riddle　of　this　faculty；　itself　concealed　from　us　in　its　sources；　and　there　is　no　means　of　making　it　any　more　intelligible。　　　The　antinomy　here　exhibited　and　resolved　rests　upon　the　proper　concept　of　taste　as　a　merely　reflective　aesthetic　judgement；　and　the　two　seemingly　conflicting　principles　are　reconciled　on　the　ground　that　they　may　both　be　true；　and　this　is　sufficient。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　owing　to　the　fact　that　the　representation　lying　at　the　basis　of　the　judgement　of　taste　is　singular；　the　determining　ground　of　taste　is　taken；　as　by　some　it　is；　to　be　agreeableness；　or；　as　others；　looking　to　its　universal　validity；　would　have　it；　the　principle　of　perfection；　and　if　the　definition　of　taste　is　framed　accordingly；　the　result　is　an　antinomy　which　is　absolutely　irresolvable　unless　we　show　the　falsity　of　both　propositions　as　contraries　（not　as　simple　contradictories）。　This　would　force　the　conclusion　that　the　concept　upon　which　each　is　founded　is　self…contradictory。　Thus　it　is　evident　that　the　removal　of　the　antinomy　of　the　aesthetic　judgement　pursues　a　course　similar　to　that　followed　by　the　Critique　in　the　solution　of　the　antinomies　of　pure　theoretical　reason；　and　that　the　antinomies；　both　here　and　in　the　Critique　of　Practical　Reason；　compel　us；　whether　we　like　it　or　not；　to　look　beyond　the　horizon　of　the　sensible；　and　to　seek　in　the　supersensible　the　point　of　union　of　all　our　faculties　a　priori：　for　we　are　left　with　no　other　expedient　to　bring　reason　into　harmony　with　itself。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK　1。

　　We　find　such　frequent　occasion　in　transcendental　philosophy　for　distinguishing　ideas　from　concepts　of　the　understanding　that　it　may　be　of　use　to　introduce　technical　terms　answering　to　the　distinction　between　them。　I　think　that　no　objection　will　be　raised　to　my　proposing　some。　Ideas；　in　the　most　comprehensive　sense　of　the　word；　are　representations　referred　to　an　object　according　to　a　certain　principle　（subjective　or　objective）；　in　so　far　as　they　can　still　never　become　a　cognition　of　it。　They　are　either　referred　to　an　intuition；　in　accordance　with　a　merely　subjective　principle　of　the　harmony　of　the　cognitive　faculties　（imagination　and　understanding）；　and　are　then　called　aesthetic；　or　else　they　are　referred　to　a　concept　according　to　an　objective　principle　and　yet　are　incapable　of　ever　furnishing　a　cognition　of　the　object；　and　are　called　rational　ideas。　In　the　latter　case；　the　concept　is　a　transcendent　concept；　and；　as　such；　differs　from　a　concept　of　understanding；　for　which　an　adequately　answering　experience　may　always　be　supplied；　and　which；　on　that　account；　is　called　immanent。　　　An　aesthetic　idea　cannot　become　a　cognition；　because　it　is　an　intuition　（of　the　imagination）　for　which　an　adequate　concept　can　never　be　found。　A　rational　idea　can　never　become　a　cognition；　because　it　involves　a　concept　（of　the　supersensible）；　for　which　a　commensurate　intuition　can　never　be　given。　　　Now　the　aesthetic　idea　might；　I　think；　be　called　an　inexponible　representation　of　the　imagination；　the　rational　idea；　on　the　other　hand；　an　indemonstrable　concept　of　reason。　The　production　of　both　is　presupposed　to　be　not　altogether　groundless；　but　rather　（following　the　above　explanation　of　an　idea　in　general）　to　take　place　in　obedience　to　certain　principles　of　the　cognitive　faculties　to　which　they　belong　（subjective　principles　in　the　case　of　the　former　and　objective　in　that　of　the　latter）。　　　Concepts　of　the　understanding　must；　as　such；　always　be　demonstrable　（if；　as　in　anatomy；　demonstration　is　understood　in　the　sense　merely　of　presentation）。　In　other　words；　the　object　answering　to　such　concepts　must　always　be　capable　of　being　given　an　intuition　（pure　or　empirical）；　for　only　in　this　way　can　they　become　cognitions。　The　concept　of　magnitude　may　be　given　a　priori　in　the　intuition　of　space；　e。g。；　of　the　right　line；　etc。；　the　concept　of　cause　in　impenetrability；　in　the　impact　of　bodies；　etc。　Consequently　both　may　be　verified　by　means　of　an　empirical　intuition；　i。e。；　the　thought　of　them　may　be　indicated　（demonstrated；　exhibited）　in　an　example；　and　this　it　must　be　possible　to　do：　for　otherwise　there　would　be　no　certainty　of　the　thought　not　being　empty；　i。e。；　having　no　object。　　　In　logic　the　expressions　demonstrable　or　indemonstrable　are　ordinarily　employed　only　in　respect　of　propositions。　A　better　designation　would　be　to　call　the　former　propositions　only　mediately；　and　the　latter；　propositions　immediately；　certain。　For　pure　philosophy；　too；　has　propositions　of　both　these　kinds…meaning　thereby　true　propositions　which　are　in　the　one　case　capable；　and　in　the　other　incapable；　of　proof。　But；　in　its　character　of　philosophy；　while　it　can；　no　doubt；　prove　on　a　priori　grounds；　it　cannot　demonstrate…unless　we　wish　to　give　the　complete　go…by　to　the　meaning　of　the　word　which　makes　demonstrate　（ostendere；　exhibere）　equivalent