the critique of judgement-第7部分

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f　nature　with　a　view　to　getting　a　thoroughly　interconnected　whole　of　experience；　and　so　is　a　subjective　principle；　i。e。；　maxim；　of　judgement。　For　this　reason；　too；　just　as　if　it　were　a　lucky　chance　that　favoured　us；　we　are　rejoiced　（properly　speaking；　relieved　of　a　want）　where　we　meet　with　such　systematic　unity　under　merely　empirical　laws：　although　we　must　necessarily　assume　the　presence　of　such　a　unity；　apart　from　any　ability　on　our　part　to　apprehend　or　prove　its　existence。　　　In　order　to　convince　ourselves　of　the　correctness　of　this　deduction　of　the　concept　before　us；　and　the　necessity　of　assuming　it　as　a　transcendental　principle　of　cognition；　let　us　just　bethink　ourselves　of　the　magnitude　of　the　task。　We　have　to　form　a　connected　experience　from　given　perceptions　of　a　nature　containing　a　maybe　endless　multiplicity　of　empirical　laws；　and　this　problem　has　its　seat　a　priori　in　our　understanding。　This　understanding　is　no　doubt　a　priori　in　possession　of　universal　laws　of　nature；　apart　from　which　nature　would　be　incapable　of　being　an　object　of　experience　at　all。　But　over　and　above　this　it　needs　a　certain　order　of　nature　in　its　particular　rules　which　are　only　capable　of　being　brought　to　its　knowledge　empirically；　and　which；　so　far　as　it　is　concerned　are　contingent。　These　rules；　without　which　we　would　have　no　means　of　advance　from　the　universal　analogy　of　a　possible　experience　in　general　to　a　particular；　must　be　regarded　by　understanding　as　laws；　i。e。；　as　necessary…for　otherwise　they　would　not　form　an　order　of　nature…though　it　be　unable　to　cognize　or　ever　get　an　insight　into　their　necessity。　Albeit；　then；　it　can　determine　nothing　a　priori　in　respect　of　these　（objects）；　it　must；　in　pursuit　of　such　empirical　so…called　laws；　lay　at　the　basis　of　all　reflection　upon　them　an　a　priori　principle；　to　the　effect；　namely；　that　a　cognizable　order　of　nature　is　possible　according　to　them。　A　principle　of　this　kind　is　expressed　in　the　following　propositions。　There　is　in　nature　a　subordination　of　genera　and　species　comprehensible　by　us：　Each　of　these　genera　again　approximates　to　the　others　on　a　common　principle；　so　that　a　transition　may　be　possible　from　one　to　the　other；　and　thereby　to　a　higher　genus：　While　it　seems　at　outset　unavoidable　for　our　understanding　to　assume　for　the　specific　variety　of　natural　operations　a　like　number　of　various　kinds　of　causality；　yet　these　may　all　be　reduced　to　a　small　number　of　principles；　the　quest　for　which　is　our　business；　and　so　forth。　This　adaptation　of　nature　to　our　cognitive　faculties　is　presupposed　a　priori　by　judgement　on　behalf　of　its　reflection　upon　it　according　to　empirical　laws。　But　understanding　all　the　while　recognizes　it　objectively　as　contingent；　and　it　is　merely　judgement　that　attributes　it　to　nature　as　transcendental　finality；　i。e。；　a　finality　in　respect　of　the　subject's　faculty　of　cognition。　For；　were　it　not　for　this　presupposition；　we　should　have　no　order　of　nature　in　accordance　with　empirical　laws；　and；　consequently；　no　guiding…thread　for　an　experience　that　has　to　be　brought　to　bear　upon　these　in　all　their　variety；　or　for　an　investigation　of　them。　　　For　it　is　quite　conceivable　that；　despite　all　the　uniformity　of　the　things　of　nature　according　to　universal　laws；　without　which　we　would　not　have　the　form　of　general　empirical　knowledge　at　all；　the　specific　variety　of　the　empirical　laws　of　nature；　with　their　effects；　might　still　be　so　great　as　to　make　it　impossible　for　our　understanding　to　discover　in　nature　an　intelligible　order；　to　divide　its　products　into　genera　and　species　so　as　to　avail　ourselves　of　the　principles　of　explanation　and　comprehension　of　one　for　explaining　and　interpreting　another；　and　out　of　material　coming　to　hand　in　such　confusion　（properly　speaking　only　infinitely　multiform　and　ill…adapted　to　our　power…of　apprehension）　to　make　a　consistent　context　of　experience。　　　Thus　judgement；　also；　is　equipped　with　an　a　priori　principle　for　the　possibility　of　nature；　but　only　in　a　subjective　respect。　By　means　of　this　it　prescribes　a　law；　not　to　nature　（as　autonomy）；　but　to　itself　（as　heautonomy）；　to　guide　its　reflection　upon　nature。　This　law　may　be　called　the　law　of　the　specification　of　nature　in　respect　of　its　empirical　laws。　It　is　not　one　cognized　a　priori　in　nature；　but　judgement　adopts　it　in　the　interests　of　a　natural　order；　cognizable　by　our　understanding；　in　the　division　which　it　makes　of　nature's　universal　laws　when　it　seeks　to　subordinate　to　them　a　variety　of　particular　laws。　So　when　it　is　said　that　nature　specifies　its　universal　laws　on　a　principle　of　finality　for　our　cognitive　faculties；　i。e。；　of　suitability　for　the　human　understanding　and　its　necessary　function　of　finding　the　universal　for　the　particular　presented　to　it　by　perception；　and　again　for　varieties　（which　are；　of　course；　common　for　each　species）　connection　in　the　unity　of　principle；　we　do　not　thereby　either　prescribe　a　law　to　nature；　or　learn　one　from　it　by　observation…although　the　principle　in　question　may　be　confirmed　by　this　means。　For　it　is　not　a　principle　of　the　determinant　but　merely　of　the　reflective　judgement。　All　that　is　intended　is　that；　no　matter　what　is　the　order　and　disposition　of　nature　in　respect　of　its　universal　laws；　we　must　investigate　its　empirical　laws　throughout　on　that　principle　and　the　maxims　founded　thereon；　because　only　so　far　as　that　principle　applies　can　we　make　any　headway　in　the　employment　of　our　understanding　in　experience；　or　gain　knowledge。

　　　　　　　　　VI。　The　Association　of　the　Feeling　of　Pleasure　　　　　　　　　　　　with　the　Concept　of　the　Finality　of　Nature。

　　The　conceived　harmony　of　nature　in　the　manifold　of　its　particular　laws　with　our　need　of　finding　universality　of　principles　for　it　must；　so　far　as　our　insight　goes；　be　deemed　contingent；　but　withal　indispensable　for　the　requirements　of　our　understanding；　and；　consequently；　a　finality　by　which　nature　is　in　accord　with　our　aim；　but　only　so　far　as　this　is　directed　to　knowledge。　The　universal　laws　of　understanding；　which　are　equally　laws　of　nature；　are；　although　arising　from　spontaneity；　just　as　necessary　for　nature　as　the　laws　of　motion　applicable　to　matter。　Their　origin　does　not　presuppose　any　regard　to　our　cognitive　faculties；　seeing　that　it　is　only　by　their　means　that　we　first　come　by　any　conception　of　the　meaning　of　a　knowledge　of　things　（of　nature）；　and　they　of　necessity　apply　to　nature　as　object　of　our　cognition　in　general。　But　it　is　contingent；　so　far　as　we　can　see；　that　the　order　of　nature　in　its　particular　laws；　with　their　wealth　of　at　least　possible　variety　and　heterogeneity　transcending　all　our　powers　of　comprehension；　should　still　in　actual　fact　be　commensurate　with　these　powers。　To　find　out　this　order　is　an　undertaking　on　the　part　of　our　understanding；　which　pursues　it　with　a　regard　to　a　necessary　end　of　its　own；　that；　namely；　of　introducing　into　nature　unity　of　principle。　This　end　must；　then；　be　attributed　to　nature　by　judgement；　since　no　law　can　be　here　prescribed　to　it　by　understanding。　　　The　attainment　of　every　aim　is　coupled　with　a　feeling　of　pleasure。　Now　where　such　attainment　has　for　its　condition　a　representation　a　priori…as　here　a　principle　for　the　reflective　judgement　in　general…the　feeling　of　pleasure　also　is　determined　by　a