the critique of judgement-第8部分

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　a　principle　for　the　reflective　judgement　in　general…the　feeling　of　pleasure　also　is　determined　by　a　ground　which　is　a　priori　and　valid　for　all　men：　and　that；　too；　merely　by　virtue　of　the　reference　of　the　object　to　our　faculty　of　cognition。　As　the　concept　of　finality　here　takes　no　cognizance　whatever　of　the　faculty　of　desire；　it　differs　entirely　from　all　practical　finality　of　nature。　　　As　a　matter　of　fact；　we　do　not；　and　cannot；　find　in　ourselves　the　slightest　effect　on　the　feeling　of　pleasure　from　the　coincidence　of　perceptions　with　the　laws　in　accordance　with　the　universal　concepts　of　nature　（the　categories）；　since　in　their　case　understanding　necessarily　follows　the　bent　of　its　own　nature　without　ulterior　aim。　But；　while　this　is　so；　the　discovery；　on　the　other　hand；　that　two　or　more　empirical　heterogeneous　laws　of　nature　are　allied　under　one　principle　that　embraces　them　both；　is　the　ground　of　a　very　appreciable　pleasure；　often　even　of　admiration；　and　such；　too；　as　does　not　wear　off　even　though　we　are　already　familiar　enough　with　its　object。　It　is　true　that　we　no　longer　notice　any　decided　pleasure　in　the　comprehensibility　of　nature；　or　in　the　unity　of　its　divisions　into　genera　and　species；　without　which　the　empirical　concepts；　that　afford　us　our　knowledge　of　nature　in　its　particular　laws；　would　not　be　possible。　Still　it　is　certain　that　the　pleasure　appeared　in　due　course；　and　only　by　reason　of　the　most　ordinary　experience　being　impossible　without　it；　bas　it　become　gradually　fused　with　simple　cognition；　and　no　longer　arrests　particular　attention。　Something；　then；　that　makes　us　attentive　in　our　estimate　of　nature　to　its　finality　for　our　understanding…an　endeavour　to　bring；　where　possible；　its　heterogeneous　laws　under　higher；　though　still　always　empirical；　laws…is　required；　in　order　that；　on　meeting　with　success；　pleasure　may　be　felt　in　this　their　accord　with　our　cognitive　faculty；　which　accord　is　regarded　by　us　as　purely　contingent。　As　against　this；　a　representation　of　nature　would　be　altogether　displeasing　to　us；　were　we　to　be　forewarned　by　it　that；　on　the　least　investigation　carried　beyond　the　commonest　experience；　we　should　come　in　contact　with　such　a　heterogeneity　of　its　laws　as　would　make　the　union　of　its　particular　laws　under　universal　empirical　laws　impossible　for　our　understanding。　For　this　would　conflict　with　the　principle　of　the　subjectively　final　specification　of　nature　in　its　genera；　and　with　our　own　reflective　judgement　in　respect　thereof。　　　Yet　this　presupposition　of　judgement　is　so　indeterminate　on　the　question　of　the　extent　of　the　prevalence　of　that　ideal　finality　of　nature　for　our　cognitive　faculties；　that　if　we　are　told　that　a　more　searching　or　enlarged　knowledge　of　nature；　derived　from　observation；　must　eventually　bring　us　into　contact　with　a　multiplicity　of　laws　that　no　human　understanding　could　reduce　to　a　principle；　we　can　reconcile　ourselves　to　the　thought。　But　still　we　listen　more　gladly　to　others　who　hold　out　to　us　the　hope　that　the　more　intimately　we　come　to　know　the　secrets　of　nature；　or　the　better　we　are　able　to　compare　it　with　external　members　as　yet　unknown　to　us；　the　more　simple　shall　we　find　it　in　its　principles；　and　the　further　our　experience　advances　the　more　harmonious　shall　we　find　it　in　the　apparent　heterogeneity　of　its　empirical　laws。　For　our　judgement　makes　it　imperative　upon　us　to　proceed　on　the　principle　of　the　conformity　of　nature　to　our　faculty　of　cognition；　so　far　as　that　principle　extends；　without　deciding…for　the　rule　is　not　given　to　us　by　a　determinant　judgement…whether　bounds　are　anywhere　set　to　it　or　not。　For；　while　in　respect　of　the　rational　employment　of　our　cognitive　faculty；　bounds　may　be　definitely　determined；　in　the　empirical　field　no　such　determination　of　bounds　is　possible。

　　　　　　　　　　VII。　The　Aesthetic　Representation　of　the　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Finality　of　Nature。

　　That　which　is　purely　subjective　in　the　representation　of　an　object；　i。e。；　what　constitutes　its　reference　to　the　subject；　not　to　the　object；　is　its　aesthetic　quality。　On　the　other　hand；　that　which　in　such　a　representation　serves；　or　is　available；　for　the　determination　of　the　object　（for　or　purpose　of　knowledge）；　is　its　logical　validity。　In　the　cognition　of　an　object　of　sense；　both　sides　are　presented　conjointly。　In　the　sense…representation　of　external　things；　the　quality　of　space　in　which　we　intuite　them　is　the　merely　subjective　side　of　my　representation　of　them　（by　which　what　the　things　are　in　themselves　as　objects　is　left　quite　open）；　and　it　is　on　account　of　that　reference　that　the　object　in　being　intuited　in　space　is　also　thought　merely　as　phenomenon。　But　despite　its　purely　subjective　quality；　space　is　still　a　constituent　of　the　knowledge　of　things　as　phenomena。　Sensation　（here　external）　also　agrees　in　expressing　a　merely　subjective　side　of　our　representations　of　external　things；　but　one　which　is　properly　their　matter　（through　which　we　are　given　something　with　real　existence）；　just　as　space　is　the　mere　a　priori　form　of　the　possibility　of　their　intuition；　and　so　sensation　is；　none　the　less；　also　employed　in　the　cognition　of　external　objects。　　　But　that　subjective　side　of　a　representation　which　is　incapable　of　becoming　an　element　of　cognition；　is　the　pleasure　or　displeasure　connected　with　it；　for　through　it　I　cognize　nothing　in　the　object　of　the　representation；　although　it　may　easily　be　the　result　of　the　operation　of　some　cognition　or　other。　Now　the　finality　of　a　thing；　so　far　as　represented　in　our　perception　of　it；　is　in　no　way　a　quality　of　the　object　itself　（for　a　quality　of　this　kind　is　not　one　that　can　be　perceived）；　although　it　may　be　inferred　from　a　cognition　of　things。　In　the　finality；　therefore；　which　is　prior　to　the　cognition　of　an　object；　and　which；　even　apart　from　any　desire　to　make　use　of　the　representation　of　it　for　the　purpose　of　a　cognition；　is　yet　immediately　connected　with　it；　we　have　the　subjective　quality　belonging　to　it　that　is　incapable　of　becoming　a　constituent　of　knowledge。　Hence　we　only　apply　the　term　final　to　the　object　on　account　of　its　representation　being　immediately　coupled　with　the　feeling　of　pleasure：　and　this　representation　itself　is　an　aesthetic　representation　of　the　finality。　The　only　question　is　whether　such　a　representation　of　finality　exists　at　all。　　　If　pleasure　is　connected　with　the　mere　apprehension　（apprehensio）　of　the　form　of　an　object　of　intuition；　apart　from　any　reference　it　may　have　to　a　concept　for　the　purpose　of　a　definite　cognition；　this　does　not　make　the　representation　referable　to　the　object；　but　solely　to　the　subject。　In　such　a　case；　the　pleasure　can　express　nothing　but　the　conformity　of　the　object　to　the　cognitive　faculties　brought　into　play　in　the　reflective　judgement；　and　so　far　as　they　are　in　play；　and　hence　merely　a　subjective　formal　finality　of　the　object。　For　that　apprehension　of　forms　in　the　imagination　can　never　take　place　without　the　reflective　judgement；　even　when　it　has　no　intention　of　so　doing；　comparing　them　at　least　with　its　faculty　of　referring　intuitions　to　concepts。　If；　now；　in　this　comparison；　imagination　（as　the　faculty　of　intuitions　a　priori）　is　undesignedly　brought　into　accord　with　understanding　（as　the　faculty　of　concepts）；　by　means　of